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Introduction: From the Body of the Detainee to a Portrait of the Regime 
 
Above all else, of course, was the principal rationalization of “no alternative.” 
The Landau Report, 1987 
 
Ten years have passed since Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel.1 
The opinion (“Public Committee”), drafted by former President of the Israel Supreme 
Court (“ISC”), Aharon Barak, is still invoked by many in the United States and 
abroad as a bold prohibition of torture. In the wake of the current American debate 
on torture, it is revisited even more often.2  The fact that an Israeli Justice laid out such 
a categorical defense of individual rights endowed the decision with an immensely 
important role for many anti-torture advocates internationally. Ostensibly asserting 
the supremacy of the rule of law in the face of the exigencies of the most severe 
security risks, the opinion glows with an aura of heroism. One expression of its lofty 
stature can be found in Justice Richard Goldstone’s emphatically titled Combating 
Terrorism: Zero Tolerance for Torture. Part of a vast literature on terror, torture and law 
“post 9/11,” the article opens with Barak’s decision. Goldstone characterizes the 
decision as “uncompromising”:  
Few countries have suffered more at the hands of terror attacks than Israel. The 
response of the Israel Supreme Court to torture has, however, remained 
uncompromising. It was put as follows by President Barak: 
‘While terrorism poses difficult questions for every country, it poses especially 
challenging questions for democratic countries, because not every effective means is a 
legal means. I discussed this in one case, in which our court held that violent 
interrogation of a suspected terrorist is not lawful, even if doing so may save human life 
by preventing impending terrorist acts’.3 
Barak’s position should not be taken for granted. On one interpretation, it can be 
seen as simply a restatement of international law, according to which torture has been 
subject to an absolute prohibition.4  However, the status of torture is not so simple. 
                                                
1 HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee against Torture v. State of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4), 
817.  
2 See, e.g., PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE 19 (University of Michigan Press 2008); Kim 
Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the "War on Terrorism", 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 285, 
290 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L. J. 1145, 1164 
(2006). 
3 Richard Goldstone, Combating Terrorism: Zero Tolerance for Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 343, 343 (2005 – 2006). 
4 The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (which Israel has signed), defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
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Recent years have produced a vast literature grappling with the philosophical 
justification for the absolute prohibition on torture.5 If only a few decades ago 
authorizing torture seemed just as unthinkable as authorizing slavery6 or genocide,7 
the efficacy and moral status of torture is currently hotly debated, as evidence of 
torture conducted under the Bush administration, often times with the collaboration 
of other countries as well as private actors, continues to accumulate. It is now well 
known that under President Bush, top-ranking officials permitted acts of torture on 
the authorization of leading lawyers’ expert opinions, including security threats of 
terror to justify such actions.  
When compared to these policies, the decision’s pristine logic reads as a powerful 
vindication of the rule of law, seemingly creating real checks on executive power. Its 
authority is derived from the Israeli constitutional Right to Dignity,8 as well as from 
international norms, primarily the Convention Against Torture. But is it really as 
uncompromising as it claims to be? Information collected in the ten years since the 
decision by various Israeli and Palestinian organizations, journalists, lawyers and 
defendants, has shown quite clearly that despite the decision, torture has not actually 
stopped. What are the legal and political conditions that allow such a gap between the 
elegant rhetoric of rights and the banality of an institutionalized practice of torture?   
This incongruity raises important questions about the current status of the rule of 
law in Israel. Similar concerns are raised by other politically charged judicial 
decisions, which have not been enforced by the executive branch.9 However, contrary 
                                                                                                                           
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Several other international 
instruments prohibit torture and have other definitions of torture, e.g. the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Protection from Torture, and the Rome 
Statute. This prohibition is widely considered as customary international law and as Jus 
Congens.   
5 For only a few examples, see, e.g., Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking 
Bomb, 37 CASE. W. J. INT’L L. 231 (2005 – 2006); Jeff McMahan, Torture, Morality and Law, 37 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 241 (2005 – 20006); David Sussman, What’s Wrong with Torture? 33 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White 
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb, 
91 VA. L. REV., 1425 (2005).  
6 In the opening of his classic 1978 essay Torture, philosopher Henry Shue writes: “Torture 
is indeed contrary to every relevant international law, including the laws of war. No other 
practice except slavery is so universally and unanimously condemned in law and human 
convention.” Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (1978).     
7 Lisa Hajjar, Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice in Historical and Global 
Perspective 5 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 311, 312 (2009).  
8 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) (Isr.).  
9 Israel’s leading human rights group, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 
emphasized this in a recent report. “Another dangerous phenomenon is the State’s blatant 
disregard of rulings by the High Court of Justice and the Administrative Courts. It is difficult 
to fathom–a court of law in Israel makes a clear legal decision and the State ignores it, as if it 
never happened. Even petitions to hold the State in contempt have not always improved 
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to the decisions on the Separation Wall10  or on unequal public funding for 
education11–which in large part remain unenforced–the situation here did not simply 
remain unchanged. The Israeli administration took the decision into account, set up 
new administrative procedures–and continued to torture. The active response to the 
decision, reorganizing practice according to a professional understanding of opinio 
juris, is all the more disquieting; the embrace of the decision’s language and its 
transformation into a torture policy raises questions concerning the application of law, 
relations between different but coexisting legal orders, and their respective 
effectiveness in a single polity. Finally, it casts doubt on the celebrated ruling itself.  
                                                                                                                           
matters, to the extent that chief Justice Dorit Beinisch recently had to remind the State that “a 
ruling of the court is not a recommendation.” The state’s disregard of judicial oversight in a 
democracy based on checks and balances is a recipe for the crumbling of democracy, the 
violation of rights, and the tyranny of the majority through the executive and legislative 
branches of government."  THE ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL, THE STATE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 71 (2009).   
10 See HCJ 2732/05 Hasin v. the Government of Israel [2009]. Available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/05/320/027/n18/05027320.n18.htm (Hebrew, accessed Oct. 
31, 2010). The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (“ACRI”) reports (id. at 72):  
Despite a court ruling from June 2006, which explicitly determined that the separation 
Barrier in this area must be removed as quickly as possible, the State dragged its feet 
for more than three years, only beginning to remove the barrier after a contempt of 
court petition was submitted. In a harshly worded decision from 5 October 2009, the 
court criticized the government for delaying the implementation for three years, 
accusing it of taking the law into its own hands and treating court rulings as 
‘recommendations only.’ 
See also HCJ 8414/05 Yasin v. Government of Israel [2007]. Available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files/05/140/084/n25/05084140.n25.HTM (Hebrew, accessed 
Oct. 31, 2010).   
11 HCJ 11163/03 Higher Arab Monitoring Committee v. Prime Minister of Israel [2004]. 
Available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/03/630/111/A18/03111630.a18.htm (Hebrew, 
accessed Oct. 31, 2010). ACRI summarizes the proceedings as follows:  
In February 2006, an expanded Supreme Court panel of seven justices rules that the 
government decision to assign national priority status to certain regions for the 
allocation of educational resources was illegal and discriminatory against Israel’s Arab 
citizens. The court gave the states twelve months to cancel this decision. Only after the 
twelve months had passed, did the State submit a request to postpone implementation 
of the court’s ruling by an additional six months, so that it could anchor in legislation 
the authority to establish national priority areas. Later, the State asked for an 
additional five-year extension to complete the complex task of setting alternative 
criteria for the allocation of Ministry of Education resources. In June 2007, the court 
granted the State a one-year extension to complete the complex task of setting 
alternative criteria for the allocation of Ministry of Education resources. When this was 
not accomplished, the original petitioners submitted a request that the State be held in 
contempt, and the court responded by pushing back the deadline for implementation 
to 1 September 2009. As of November 2009, there are still no indications that the 
government is preparing to carry out the Court ruling. 
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In this essay, we will suggest that the decision, which has been understood to stand 
for robust protections for human rights, has not operated that way;12  while it may have 
reduced torture for a while, its main result has been to strengthen governmental 
impunity for torture–while silencing its victims.13  We will characterize the regime of 
security investigations that emerged after Public Committee as one in which torture 
became more solidly centralized, organized, and managed from above. At the same 
time, the decision creates the false impression of “zero tolerance for torture.” Hence, 
the prohibition of torture cannot be understood as the real shift following Public 
Committee. As has famously been shown by the Landau Commission (1987),14  some 
form of torture has been systematic in Israel since the occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza in 1967.15  In the last ten years, what is truly new is the administrative 
structure in which torture is managed, through a certain understanding of “necessity.” 
We thus label the regime that ensued post Public Committee a regime of necessity 
management.  
From a contemporary, global perspective, the strategy of evading accountability 
that followed Public Committee does not stand alone. The world which the decision 
foreshadows is a paradoxical one; torture is manifestly illegal, but at the same time the 
victims of torture are almost invariably deemed to lack a legal remedy. They remain 
voiceless, without the evidentiary means to articulate and prove what was done to 
them. Compensation is almost always unavailable; the mutilation of bodies and spirits 
remains unrecognized, and perpetrators consistently–in one way or another–go 
unpunished.16  If political power says anything to its victims, it is almost always an 
apology on behalf of torture; never do we hear an apology to its victims. 17   
                                                
12 We thus adopt what Scheppelle describes as a “sociological” approach to the legal and 
moral questions torture raises. See Scheppelle, supra note 2, at 292: "By arguing from sociology, 
I can address the question: Are coercive interrogation techniques in fact being used in the sorts of situations 
that have been invoked hypothetically to persuade people that such techniques are necessary? . . .  The 
normative force that seems to emanate from the hypothetical case of the nuclear terrorist 
cannot be invoked as a justification for actual policy to engage in torture and other abusive 
interrogation if the hypothetical does not track the real-world problems." 
13 Previous accounts have often emphasized that the decision left the door open for the 
legislator to reintroduce torture. From a contemporary perspective, whether that is true is 
utterly unimportant. Indeed, our argument is that after the decision there was no real need for 
legislation in order to continue with at least some of the old practices. Once that was realized, 
legislation became highly improbable and in fact did not occur. See Matthew Amand, Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel et al: Landmark Human Rights Decision by the 
Israeli High Court of Justice or Status Quo Maintained?, NCJ INT’L L. & COM. REG. 655, 656 (2000); 
Ardi Imseis, “Moderate” Torture on Trial: Critical Reflections on the Israeli Supreme Court Judgment 
Concerning the Legality of General Security Service Interrogation Methods, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 328 
(2001); Nimer Sultany, The Legacay of Justice Aharon Barak: A Critical Review, HARV. IN’L L. J. 
ONLINE (2007), available at www.harvardilj.org/attach.php?id=112 (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).       
14 Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Security Service Regarding 
Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 ISR. L. REV. 146 (1989) [hereinafter The Landau Report].  
15 Id., at 158, 160-161. 
16 The moral significance of this position was described by French philosopher Jean-
François Lyotard with the term "Differend." See JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: 
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Going back ten years to Public Committee, or twenty years to The Landau 
Commission Report, provides a rich context in which to understand the present 
situation.  We will argue that Public Committee foreshadows impunity18  as a central 
characteristic of the legal regimes in “The West” at this moment.19         
Although some very disturbing testimonies have been collected in Israel, the 
available evidence does not point to the kind of horror that leaked into the public 
sphere following investigations conducted by the US authorities in the aftermath of 
9/11. In large part, they are signs of “torture lite.”20  But even the less extreme 
testimonies we will be discussing fit squarely into the framework of practices banned 
by the ISC.21  
To a large extent, the contemporary debate on torture has taken the shape of a 
struggle over the very definition of the term.22  For the purposes of this essay, torture is 
defined in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture.23  While this definition may be 
                                                                                                                           
PHRASES IN DISPUTE (Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 6th ed. 2002) (1988). See also Adi 
Ophir, Shifting the Moral Domain in Lyotard’s Le Differend, 4(2) CONSTELLATIONS, 189 (2002).  
17 On apologies see Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, With Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV. 569 (2007-
2008). 
18 The Landau Commission’s recommendations authorizing "moderate physical pressure" 
were confirmed by the government, and in effect were binding law until they were struck 
down with Public Committee.  
19 Thus, we think of our inquiry as a kind of "history of the present," in Michel Foucault’s 
terms. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977). 
On the importance of history in the post 9/11 discussion on torture, see Neil Macmaster, 
Torture: From Algiers to Abu Ghreib, 46 RACE CLASS 1, 4 (2004).  
20 Ardi Imseis ironically labels the practice "moderate torture," in a paraphrase on the 
"moderate physical pressure," the term the Landau Commission used for the physical methods 
of interrogation that it approved. See Imseis, supra note 13.  
21 There may be other practices which are designed to humiliate and deject “Security 
Prisoners.” These are to be found in various stages of the criminal procedure–not only in 
interrogation but often time in detention and incarceration. Although important and morally 
questionable, these are outside of the scope of the current research. A more general view of 
torture would have to take them into account.  
22 This is illustrated starkly and amusingly by John Stewart’s interview with John Yoo on 
The Daily Show, http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-january-11-2010/john-yoo-pt--
1 (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).  
23 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
Torture Convention], available at http:// www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm. 
For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
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less than clear, we can only assume a certain transparency of the text of the 
convention. Some may think that labeling the practices employed by Israeli security 
forces "torture" is a partisan, rather than a descriptive statement. Others have echoed 
this opinion, in response to the physical abuse of suspects that American security 
forces secretly flew to offshore prisons. For the purposes of this essay, however, it is 
unnecessary to develop an analytic definition of torture of our own. As Justice Barak’s 
decision aligns itself with international law and appeals to the Convention against 
Torture, so will we.       
Because much of the relevant material remains classified, the available evidence 
sometimes does not point directly to torture. What it does show very clearly, however, 
is a framework of agreement between the executive and courts by which some forms 
of torture are protected. As opposed to discovering evidence of torture, identifying 
this pattern does not require painstaking investigation; it merely calls for attention to 
the relevant public statements made by Israeli authorities. Particularly, a necessity 
procedure has been designed by Israeli administrators, in a logical self-contradiction 
conflating exception and the norm.24  Judges in trial courts as well as in the ISC 
remain receptive to this paradoxical category.  
The unavailability of direct evidence of torture is not extraneous to the problem 
we will be discussing. Rather, it is both tortures’ condition of possibility and one of its 
most salient moral shortcomings. Under this regime, the torture victim is required to 
testify as to a trauma, the evidence of which has been destroyed, obliterated, or 
otherwise made unavailable.25  For this reason, we focus on the mechanisms that 
regulate torture, on its administrative structure, rather than on particular instances. In 
themselves, these mechanisms provide compelling evidence for the use of torture. 
After having been injured by the act of torture, the mechanisms that erase torture 
from the public sphere harm its victims once again. However, this additional harm 
cannot be analytically differentiated from the physical pain inflicted. The co-
appearance of these two harms reflects their mutual dependency as essential parts of 
contemporary practices of torture. How does law partake in this silencing of victims?   
These mechanisms of regulation also shed light on the nature of security and 
governmentality in Israel in the last decade. In a 1986 essay, eight years before the 
end of apartheid, South African novelist J.M. Coetzee aptly wrote “relations in the 
torture room provide a metaphor, bare and extreme, for relations between 
                                                                                                                           
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 On some of the interpretive problems with this definition under U.S. law, see Scheppelle, 
supra note 2, at 289 – 299, 303 – 304.  
24 For a philosophical analysis of this juridical formation see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO 
SACER 15-29 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford University Press, 1998). Alan 
Dershowitz, who espoused a limited legalization of torture, recognizes this cannot be done 
through the category of necessity, which in his words is "a state of nature defense." He thus 
rejects the validity of what he considers as a conflation of emergency and norm. Alan M. 
Dershowitz, Is it Necessary to Apply "Physical Pressure" to Terrorists – And Lie About it?, 23 ISR. L. 
REV. 192, 196 – 197 (1989). 
25 See LYOTARD, supra note 16, at 57.    
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authoritarianism and its victims.”26  One year later, the Landau Commission 
inadvertently reiterated this metaphor. While endorsing “moderate physical pressure” 
on detainees, it proclaimed “methods of police interrogation which are employed in 
any given regime are a faithful mirror of the character of the entire regime.”27  In 
Public Committee, Justice Barak recites it yet again, while explaining that the methods 
that the Landau Commission had authorized are illegal.28  The three texts envision 
power through a visceral relationship between the torturer and the suffering victim. 
Since we are denied access to this relationship, looking at the regulatory environment in 
which torture comes into being will provide an illuminating substitute.     
What is truly perplexing about Public Committee is that its complicity with torture 
cannot simply be reduced to the conclusion that the decision is in error. As we will 
show, its self-defeating nature demands an attention to its rhetoric.  To be sure, the last 
ten years have made impunity even more conspicuous. Particular attention will be 
given in this respect to a decision the current President of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
Justice Dorit Beynish, issued relatively recently, on a motion challenging the 
continued abuse of detainees.29   
This essay consists of three parts. Part I is a close reading of Public Committee in the 
context of the administrative reality it had created since it was issued. Our objective 
here is to lay out the anatomy of necessity management. This regime cannot be 
understood without revisiting the earlier history of torture in Israel, since 1967. Part 
II, a reading of the Landau Commission Report, will provide the necessary historical 
background. This Commission was formed in the wake of growing public concerns 
that torture has become a normalized practice in ensuring Israel’s control over the 
Palestinians. The Commission found that torture was indeed systemic, and 
recommended legalizing a “moderate” form of torture. We examine the continuities 
and discontinuities between the Commission’s recommendations, the reasoning in 
Public Committee which ostensibly struck them down, and the current reality of 
“security” investigations.  
Part III will present the theoretical assumptions of the regime of necessity 
management. We will discuss the regime in light of a newfound transnational sovereign 
immunity ("un-prosecution"), of which the Israeli strategy of necessity management is merely 
                                                
26 J.M Coetzee, Into the Dark Chamber: The Ovelist and South Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1986, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/02/home/coetzee-chamber.html 
(accessed 10.31.10). Today, it’s no longer analytically (and politically) feasible to separate the 
“temporary” authoritarian control of the West Bank and Gaza from the “democracy” in Israel 
proper. The distinction between “authoritarian” and “democratic” in Coetzee’s words is 
therefore not useful. For several different explanations of this conclusion, see the essays in THE 
POWER OF INCLUSIVE EXCLUSION: ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni and Sari Hanafi eds., 2009). Coetzee’s 
metaphor nevertheless pertains to any regime that chooses to torture. Calling to attention the 
particularities of torture, it illuminates the variations political violence can take.    
27 Supra note 14, at 182.  
28 Public Committee, supra note 1, at paragraph 22. 
29 HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee v. State of Israel [2009], (Hebrew, available through 
www.takdin.co.il).  
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a harbinger, and which has been applied to U.S. torture as well. Finally, we will also 
offer some preliminary reflections on the legal responses that can be adopted if torture 
is to be seriously (and politically) fought.  
 
Part I: From Criminal Exception to Administrative Management  
1. “Necessity” as Autonomous Judgment 
Public Committee brought an end to procedures in seven different petitions, the 
earliest of which was submitted to the ISC in 1994. Several NGOs,30  alongside 
individuals who claimed to have been tortured,31  appealed in separate petitions which 
were joined by the court. During the hearing it became clear that torture had ceased. 
And yet, the court did not declare the issue moot, but decided to issue a principled 
decision. Was this ruling really given as a remedy for other detainees and defendants 
who presumably might be tortured? Politically, the times were turbulent. Justice 
Barak himself points to the heated state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the very 
opening of the opinion.32  However, we do not refer to the narrative of the Israeli-
Palestinian struggle simply to emphasize the continued vulnerability of (potential) 
victims of torture. The five years it took to hand down the ruling cast a doubt on the 
effectiveness of any decision.  
Justice Barak’s opinion discusses several methods of torture. These include 
shaking, various contorted sitting positions–typically tilted, handcuffed, head-covered 
or blindfolded with loud music–and sleep deprivation.33  While the decision discusses 
these in some length, it prohibits torture at large:34  
This conclusion is in perfect accord with (various) International Law treaties–to which 
Israel is a signatory–which prohibit the use of torture, “cruel, inhuman treatment” and 
“degrading treatment”…These prohibitions are “absolute.” There are no exceptions to 
them and there is no room for balancing. Indeed violence directed at a suspect’s body 
or spirit does not constitute a reasonable investigation practice. The use of violence 
                                                
30 The Association of Civil Rights in Israel, Center for Defense of the Individual, Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel.  
31 Hatem Abu Zayda, Wa’al Al Kaaqua, Ibramim Abdallah Ganimat, Abd Al Rahman 
Ismail Ganimat, Fuoad Awad Quran, Issa Ali Batat.  
32 Public Committee, supra note 1, at paragraph 1.  
33 For a more detailed description of the means of interrogation see id., para. 9-13. 
34 Others have argued that the decision only applies to the particular methods of 
interrogation that were discussed. We do not think such a reading reflects the text of the 
decision. See, e.g., Amand, supra note 13.  
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during investigations can potentially lead to the investigator being held criminally 
liable.35 
An interrogation, writes Justice Barak, can be made uncomfortable in various ways 
in order to increase the pressure on the suspect to reveal information. Importantly, 
General Security Service (“GSS”) standards of interrogation cannot authorize such 
pressure in a way that would exceed the pressure permitted in police interrogations.36  
A reasonable interrogation, he continues, “may result in insufficient sleep.” However, 
“sleep deprivation for a prolonged period…may be deemed a use of an investigation 
method which surpasses the least restrictive means.”37   
The most interesting part of the decision deals with the defense of necessity. 
Seemingly a mere obiter dictum, it unwittingly spells out the avenues the executive took 
in order to shield practices of torture from public scrutiny. But before this can be 
demonstrated, certain attention must be given to Justice Barak’s reasoning.  
Justice Barak’s opinion allows an interrogator, under particular circumstances, 
protection from criminal liability. This protection is granted under the doctrine of 
necessity, when the crime is justified. The now iconic image of the ticking bomb,38  
which emerged in the French-Algerian anti-colonial struggle,39  is re-contextualized in 
a way that will later be massively reproduced in the U.S. context.40  In this scenario, 
the interrogator is presumably justified in his act of torture, precisely because he 
reasonably believes that he’s saving lives.41  Justice Barak aligns torture with any other 
ordinary criminal activity in this respect. If the interrogator knows–with the required 
immediacy and certainty–that the crime he will be committing in torture will save 
numerous lives, he is permitted ex post facto to break the law. As commentators have 
emphasized, the form of justification here is the same as in paradigm cases of self-
defense.42    
As Justice Barak was careful to clarify, such a decision is to be made in the context 
of action. The interrogator then takes full responsibility for his crime: just like any 
other defendant, he may raise the issue of necessity as a defense.43  The 
                                                
35 Interestingly, Justice Barak includes not only "torture" but "cruel, inhuman treatment" 
and "degrading treatment" as well, categories that later will be central in the efforts by US 
lawyers to legalize some forms of detainee abuse. Public Committee, supra note 1 at para. 15. 
36 Public Committee, supra note 1 at para. 20.  
37 Id., at para. 23.   
38 For compelling critiques of this popular thought experiment see Scheppele, supra note 2 
and Shue and Luban, supra note 5.  
39 Macmaster, supra note 19, at 4.  
40 See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 2; Luban supra note 5.  
41 There has been considerable academic debate over this point in the last few years, in 
which we will briefly intervene below.  
42 See McMahan, supra note 19, 244, 241-248. For use of deadly force comparison see 
Winfried Brugger, May Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses from German Law, 48 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 661.  
43 This position is very similar to the "civil disobedience" argument Darius Rejali attributes 
to Bowden. See DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 533 (2009).    
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administration, on the other hand, is not authorized to judge in advance which 
actions are to be protected under the doctrine of necessity. Just as it is impossible to 
authorize the act of homicide under this doctrine, it is impossible to authorize torture 
under necessity; such an authorization would misguidedly turn the crime of torture 
into an exceptional crime, a position that Justice Barak painstakingly rejects.44    
Special attention should be given to how notions of temporality and experience are 
construed in the judgment of torture. The two related principles are: (1) whether a 
perpetrator of the crime of torture is protected or not can only be determined after 
the fact (“the temporality condition”); (2) this determination can only be made regarding 
the experience of an individual perpetrator, in respect to the particular set of 
circumstances that were given at the event (“the experience condition”). This casuistic 
justification requires that the individual interrogator make an autonomous judgment call 
and break the law. Whether the breach was in accordance with a publicly recognizable 
morality is determined after the fact. Barak emphasizes that necessity does not have 
normative value as such, and is not a source of authority.  
Such a judgment call is arguably an excruciatingly difficult one, particularly for the 
interrogators who are daily exposed to extreme situations. On the other hand, they 
are precisely those most likely to abuse the prohibition (not every profession has this 
problematic potential of turning torture into an easy shortcut). According to this 
understanding, only the cumbersome burden on the individual interrogator protects 
the absolute prohibition on torture from being watered down. In the normative world 
that Justice Barak has created there is a seemingly strong disincentive to torture, 
which neatly unites the commanding purpose of the prohibition and the way in which 
                                                
44 See Public Committee, supra note 1, at para. 34:  
In the Court’s opinion, a general authority to establish directives respecting the use of 
physical means during the course of a GSS interrogation cannot be implied from the 
“necessity” defense. The “necessity” defense does not constitute a source of authority, 
allowing GSS investigators to make use of physical means during the course of 
interrogations. The reasoning underlying our position is anchored in the nature of the 
“necessity” defense. This defense deals with deciding those cases involving an individual reacting to 
a given set of facts; it is an ad hoc endeavor, in reaction to an event. It is the result of an improvisation 
given the unpredictable character of the events (See Feller, ibid. at 209). Thus, the very nature of 
the defense does not allow it to serve as the source of a general administrative power. 
The administrative power is based on establishing general, forward looking criteria, as 
noted by Professor Enker:  
Necessity is an after-the-fact judgment based on a narrow set of considerations in which we 
are concerned with the immediate consequences not far-reaching and long-range 
consequences, on the basis of a clearly established order of priorities of both means and 
ultimate values . . . The defence of Necessity does not define a code of primary 
normative behaviour. Necessity is certainly not a basis for establishing a broad detailed 
code of behaviour such as how one should go about conducting intelligence 
interrogations in security matters, when one may or may not use force, how much force 
may be used and the like (Enker, The Use of Physical Force in Interrogations and the Necessity 
Defense, in ISRAEL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE ISSUE OF 
TORTURE 61,62 (1995)). (Emphases added).  
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it shapes behavior, precisely the deterrence effect presumably provided by the 
criminal sanction in general.45 
On the rare occasions when torture must be used, the interrogator is portrayed as 
a hero, putting himself on the line for the wellbeing of the community. The 
extraordinary circumstances in which torture might actually be effective put him 
between a rock and a hard place.46  On the one hand he can torture, in which case he 
risks his own freedom: in such a situation he may be exposed not only to a criminal 
conviction, but also presumably to public denigration and perhaps a prison sentence 
(he has broken an enshrined prohibition). On the other hand, if he doesn’t choose 
such heroism he may be betraying his professional obligation to go the extra mile to 
defend the lives of others.  In the circumstances of emergency, state violence first 
becomes visible and only later is subject to justification. Justice is no longer relieved of 
responsibility, as Michel Foucault may have put it.47   
 
2. The Application Clause 
 
The problem with the decision begins in the nexus connecting this legal theory 
and the actual practices of the security services.48  Justice Barak does not say much 
about the application of the prohibition, and generally remains on the rather 
abstracted level of principle. Therefore, threads connecting his decision to the 
practices that have developed since 1999 must be discerned from the single clause in 
which he touches upon day-to-day administrative behavior (“the application clause”): 
                                                
45 Compare REJALI, supra note 43, at 533. 
46 Scheppelle explains how extraordinary these circumstances actually are. Indeed, she 
concludes that their rarified nature makes them an "irresponsible hypothetical." See Scheppele 
supra note 2, at 337. Alon Harel and Assaf Sharon, on the other hand, offer a philosophical 
explanation to the prohibition on torture, which nevertheless recognizes that in some 
circumstances, which must remain undefined, torture may be justifiably performed. I take 
their suggestion can also be understood as an illuminating explication of the operation of these 
two conditions. See Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, What is really Wrong with Torture?, 6 J. OF INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 241 (2008). 
47 See FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 10. 
48 This emphasis on actual application can be found in Scheppele, supra note 2. In his 
lecture "Power and Glory" (January 11, 2007), Giorgio Agamben explained how the 
separation between law and its application, is a central condition for the violence of democratic 
regimes. Building upon a genealogy of the separation between the ecclesiastical realms of the 
father, the son and the Holy Ghost, he explains the democratic separation of power to three 
branches (the separation of power from glory). In the movement of law from the celestial realm 
to terrestrial (from the father to the Son, or–for example–from the judiciary to the police) there 
is always an excess of violence that is created. In liberal theory, that remainder is often denied, 
or thought of as an unintended accident: "collateral damage". However, such a position 
cannot explain the way in which the very separation of power structurally reproduces that 
excess of violence, as a central technique of the reproduction of power. The lecture is available 
at  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jz7dxevH7Rs (accessed Oct. 31, 2001). 
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Just as the existence of the “necessity” defense does not bestow authority, so too the 
lack of authority does not negate the applicability of the necessity defense or that of 
other defenses from criminal liability. The Attorney General can instruct himself regarding the 
circumstances in which investigators shall not stand trial, if they claim to have acted from a feeling of 
“necessity.”(Emphasis added).49 
What is the nature of this "self-instruction?" Although Public Committee prohibits 
torture, these short lines effectively created a space of impunity for state officials to 
commit crimes within the so-called “necessity procedure.”  
But before discussing the procedure, it is important to analyze the details of the 
quote above. Is Barak’s vision of his decision’s application consistent with the other 
(more high-minded) parts of it? First we get the formulation of "just as [X] so too 
[Y]." The two are weighed against each other, like two additive inverses the sum of 
which is zero. Now notice the emphasized sentence. Justice Barak quite manifestly 
does not require the protection of “necessity” to be argued in open court. Rather, he 
points to the Attorney General’s (“AG”) own discretion in that matter. Crucially, the 
text signals to the AG that when hearing an interrogator’s claim he is not required to 
ascertain if the protection of “necessity” applies; hence, he is not understood as replacing the 
judge that would hear the case in court. A much lower bar of a mere claim to a feeling 
of action from “necessity” is set. This is totally different from deciding on "necessity" 
(as the legal doctrine explained in other parts of the decision); the latter of course 
demands that the conditions of experience and temporality be met. Put differently, 
"necessity" is not a determination of the mental state of the perpetrator alone ("did he 
feel he is acting from necessity?"), it is a determination of whether the objective circumstances 
reasonably required the prohibited action. The allusion to a "feeling of necessity" here 
is a confusing one, which positions the AG’s determination a far cry from the narrow 
test of "necessity." This choice of words cannot be a mistake.    
In such a capacity, the AG does not acquit the interrogator, and is not required to 
declare if his action was legal. He is simply deciding whether to issue an indictment.  
Justice Barak could easily have written that the AG would have to make a legally 
binding determination, using his professional judgment and finding that the 
protection of necessity actually applies. That would doubtlessly narrow the set of cases 
that could remain unprosecuted, or at least widen the grounds for judicial review of 
the AG’s decision. The AG would of course still have the power, in "genuine" cases of 
necessity, not to prosecute.50   
 
3. Be Careful, but Don’t Worry 
 
Compared with the time it took the judiciary to issue its decision, the Israeli 
administration was far more efficient in responding to the issue of torture. One month 
after the decision was published, AG Elyakim Rubinstein (who has since been 
                                                
49 See Public Committee, supra note 1, at paragraph 38. 
50 Once again, such a power is objectionable and hotly debated.  
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appointed Justice of the Supreme Court), issued a document reflecting the state’s new 
position. The memo, dated October 28, 1999, was both addressed to the AG and 
signed by him, mirroring Barak’s rather oblique formulation of the AG “instructing 
himself.” Citing the application clause, Rubinstein enumerates the circumstances in 
which he will “consider” not pressing charges against an interrogator.51 
Several facets of this memo make it a blueprint for necessity management. But before 
looking into the text itself, it is useful to ask once again: what does it mean for an AG 
to “instruct himself?” One reasonable reading is that a policy would be laid out for the 
exercise of discretion when deciding whether to press charges against individuals 
suspected of torture-related crimes. Such guidelines could either be restricted to 
internal use, or circulated to GSS interrogators. While the former might be 
problematic in terms of transparency, the latter would doubtlessly have an effect on 
the level of deterrence Public Committee would create; as the tendency to prosecute 
decreases, so does the disincentive to torture; the incentive to lubricate the workings of 
security with coercion rises correspondingly.  
To be sure, the mere circulation of such instructions invariably reduces the 
deterrence effect. That is probably what AG Rubinstein intended. Indeed, that’s the 
message that comes across from Article 4 of the memo, which without the right 
context would seem quite vague. Its circuitous language instructs the interrogators to 
“always note the rule of law and the rights of suspects; but while acting within the 
limits of law, they should not ignore their own need for proper protection in their 
work.”52 We read this language to have a simple meaning: “be careful, but don’t 
worry.” For an instruction that avowedly aims at increasing “legal certainty”, such a 
message seems decidedly ineffective, unless is it to be understood as increasing the 
certainty of immunity.  
But there is a more important aspect of these instructions. They point to the 
procedures that will now be performed, before committing the crime of torture, inside 
the GSS. Thus, they effectively overturn the way necessity was construed in Public 
Committee–eliminating the conditions of experience and temporality. Rubinstein 
explains that the AG will decide whether to press charges, among other things, 
according to (1) the level of the officials who were consulted in performing the act of 
torture; (2) their involvement in the decision to torture; (3) the degree to which it was 
regulated. These instructions redesign the interrogator’s behavior so as to increase the 
supervision of high-ranking executives and the government. They make the GSS 
interrogator consult with officials above him, and spread responsibility up the 
administrative ladder. In effect, the interrogator turns to a mere organ of a top 
executive–a cog in the machine. His potential mens rea is diluted by extending it to 
people who are not in the interrogation room and possibly out of the political reach of 
the prosecution. This effect of centralizing power is not implicit in Justice Barak’s 
decision–which merely allows for it to happen.  
Notice that the memo reconstructs the role of the GSS interrogator in a way that is 
very different from the heroic defender of society that Barak had envisioned (where 
                                                
51 Motion on behalf of the petitioners in HCJ 5100/94 [2009] (Hebrew), app. 11. 
52 Id.  
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the interrogator is a proto-revolutionary).53  Here the paradigmatic interrogator is a 
well trained follower of rules. He affixes his ear to the body of a detainee and rattles it 
just a little. Does he hear the ticking of the bomb? He responds as a meticulous 
watchmaker, following the manual that has been prepared for him by his 
supervisors,54  a manual that simply directs him back to ask them what to do.  But 
such a manual is exactly what the conditions of experience and temporality seem to 
prohibit (remember the emphasis on "improvisation"). However, as it turns out, the 
application clause functioned as an invitation for the executive to implement and 
design such a manual. Article 7(2)(b)(4) of Rubenstein’s memo points directly to these 
practices: 
The GSS should have internal guidelines, inter alia, on the system of consultations and 
confirmations within the organization which are needed for the matter. (emphases 
added). 55 
The machinations of the system of “consultations and confirmations,” which came 
to be known as “the necessity procedure,” have not been published and are unknown 
to us. This "internal" nature of the system is grounded in Rubinstein’s memo– 
ironically reproducing the self-referential logic and instructing the GSS once again to 
"instruct itself." This time the instructions would not be circulated to the public. Thus, 
Rubinstein decided to organize the guidelines on torture in a way that would 
reestablish the incentive to torture: both a scenario in which the guidelines remain for 
the internal use of the AG office (without GSS involvement), and the scenario of 
publicly published guidelines, would contradict the conditions of experience and 
temporality. Either of them, on their own, would have created a greater disincentive 
to torture than the combination that Rubinstein chose.  
Lacking access to the language of the "necessity procedure", we will try to show 
how it works in practice. 
 
4. Confirmations, Consultations and the Necessity Procedure  
 
What we now have before us is a precarious legal scheme made of three different 
tiers representing three levels of transparency and public accountability: (1) a 
Supreme Court decision banning torture, with criminal law exceptions for 
unexpected out-of-the-ordinary circumstances; (2) an administrative “instruction,” 
                                                
53 See, e.g., Henry Shue’s classic 1978 paper: “essentially . . . torture would be like an act of 
civil disobedience at least in the respect that the conscientious torturer would willingly submit 
to charges and trial. If the torture had demonstrably prevented the end of the world, the 
charges would presumably be dropped or the sentence suspended.” Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF., 124 (1978). Shue elaborates this in his 2006 essay, supra note 5, at 236. 
54 The image of the "meticulous watchmaker" is taken from FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 
13.  
55 Motion on behalf of the petitioners, supra note 51.  
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authorizing the GSS to formulate when such circumstances arise, while pointing to a 
system of consultations and confirmations; (3) A classified document of guidelines indicating 
what the GSS interrogator should do when he actually sees fit to torture, and how.  
The first norm is public, and a grand triumph for human rights; the second is 
circulated to Israeli government officials only and is underspecified; the third 
authorizes torture and is exposed only to those “in the business.” What is the logic 
linking the three? Which is the Kelsenian "higher" norm? Perhaps instead of thinking, 
with the twentieth century German jurist, of a towering normative pyramid, we should be 
thinking of an onion to be peeled from the visible outside to its invisible heart.   
It is perhaps not surprising that actions consistent with the legal scheme’s 
innermost norms are sometimes exposed. On November 8, 2006 Haaretz published an 
article titled “Complaints: GSS Interrogators Tear Off Beards and Sodomize 
Detainees.”56  The article reports the return of the GSS to the “old interrogation 
methods” that were expressly banned in Public Committee. It is based on new 
testimonies that The Public Committee Against Torture had collected. These have 
been put in affidavit form and filed as criminal complaints. The organization 
estimated that since Public Committee about 500 such complaints have been filed, none 
of which resulted in a criminal prosecution.57  
Alongside the old methods that have supposedly been abolished, Haaretz describes 
new methods that had previously been unknown. One detainee, Assam Rashed from 
the city of Tulkarem, described how his beard was torn off. Aaref Tabajna of Nablus 
said that he was tied from the ceiling with his head down, while the interrogators hit 
his testicles with hands and a cloth-covered rod. The most disturbing complaint came 
from a detainee who remained anonymous. His affidavit describes an interrogator 
who called himself “Captain Daniel.” Captain Daniel threatened the detainee with 
sodomy and then proceeded to insert objects into the complainant’s rectum.58  
Perhaps even more revealing than the information on torture is the state’s 
response to the article. When confronted with the total lack of criminal investigations 
against GSS interrogators, the GSS spokesman replied that “disciplinary measures 
were taken.”59  But disciplinary measures are simply irrelevant; if anything, they are a 
cover-up technique. The very decision to take measures is evidence that criminal 
conduct was actually found. Disciplinary measures can therefore only be secondary to 
a criminal procedure.  
The AG office’s response to the article seems more to the point: 
                                                
56 Nir Hasson, Complaints: GSS Interrogators Tear Off Beards and Sodomize Detainees, HAARETZ, 
Nov. 8, 2006, (Hebrew), available at http://www.haaretz.co.il (Haaretz archive article no. 
130636) (accessed Oct. 31, 2010). 
57 Nir Hasson, Rights Groups: Shin Bet Torturing Jailed Palestinians, HAARETZ, May 6, 2007, 
available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/856142.html (accessed Oct. 31, 2010).  
58 Complaints, supra note 56. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
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There are cases in which examination brings about amendments in procedures or similar 
changes. In exceptional cases, when we find that indeed there was a deviation from 
procedure, we decide upon a disciplinary or criminal procedure.60 (Emphases added).   
Notice the unique relation between exception and the norm. It is not exception 
that "brings about amendments" in the norm; fluctuation is embedded in the norm 
itself. Interrogators are thus expected to work according to moving guidelines; 
exception or deviation is understood as uncoordinated movement.  And if, as the AG 
suggested, this deviation is not a criminal offense but rather the breach of an 
administrative procedure, it seems quite natural to stop at disciplinary measures.  
The GSS response does, however, shed a little light on the content of this dynamic 
procedure: “The confirmation to use force in interrogations is given at the least from 
the head of the interrogation team, and at times comes from the head of the GSS 
himself.”61 Two days after the publication of the article, on November 10, the GSS 
published a “clarification”: “the confirmation to use special means in interrogation 
can be given only by the head of GSS.”62     
In May 2007, the Public Committee against Torture published a new report titled 
“Ticking Bomb.”63  Rather than focusing on a large number of cases, this report was 
organized around relatively few, detailed accounts. Hence, the stories of nine 
detainees who were severely tortured are unfolded–from arrest, through 
interrogation, trial, and (failed) attempts to ignite criminal prosecutions against 
interrogators. For our purposes, the most relevant aspect of the report is the way the 
administrative practices surrounding torture are revealed. We thus get another peek 
through the keyhole at the third and innermost tier of regulation, into secret 
procedures that function as norms, which determine the decision to torture. 
In the discussion of Bahjat Yaman’s case, an extremely interesting memo is 
brought to the readers’ attention. Yaman claimed he was subject to various kinds of 
physical and mental torture, including hearing his own screams recorded while he was 
given rest. This memo is the only document that corroborates Yaman’s testimony. It 
reads:  
Regarding Bahjat Yaman. Urgency in obtaining information for prevention of terrorist 
attack. Interrogated from 5.20.04 21:15 to 5.22.04 02:40 under the defense of necessity and 
means were alternately used.64 (Emphasis added).   
                                                
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Clarification, HAARETZ, Nov. 10, 2006, (Hebrew), avaialable at http://haaretz.co.il 
(Haaretz archive article no. 1306904) (accessed Oct. 31, 2010). 
63 Available at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/en/node/69 (accessed Oct. 31, 2010). 
64 Motion on behalf of the petitioners, supra note 51, app. 5 and 6 (the document and an 
affidavit submitted to the Israeli High Court of Justice by Yaman’s attorney, Mr. Labib 
Habib). It is very important to emphasize that the original document was never obtained by 
Yaman’s defense lawyer, Labib Habib. When Habib came to receive the evidence material for 
this case, he was not allowed to make a copy of this document, and was instructed to make a 
handwritten copy. He later gave an affidavit concerning the document. The content of the 




The simple mechanism of “the necessity procedure” becomes visible by 
juxtaposing this memo with the GSS and AG responses to the Haaretz article. When 
the interrogator tortures (the state did not deny that “means” here refers to “physical” 
interrogation), he already knows that he is protected by the “defense of necessity.” 
Again we see the temporality condition reversed. The interrogators’ confidence that 
they will not be prosecuted is provided by the fact that the very highest official in the GSS 
has authorized torture a priori. Any prosecution would have to include him as a co-
conspirator, a highly unlikely result: “Be careful, but don’t worry.”65  
As shown above, former AG Elyakim Rubinstein was the one to suggest a pattern 
of “consultations and confirmations;” hence the causal connection between this 
system of authorizations and the AG’s instructions, allowing the GSS to practice 
torture as an internal procedure. This connection has also been pointed out by former 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. In a letter to Avigdor Feldman, counsel for the 
Public Committee Against Torture (17 October 2007), Olmert’s office wrote: 
On the basis of this assertion by the Attorney General, internal guidelines have been 
prepared by the GSS, which state how consultations with senior GSS officials will be 
conducted when the circumstances of a particular interrogation fulfills the requirements 
of the necessity qualification…66 (Emphases added).   
Again, we see that the guidelines allow the protection of necessity to be decided 
upon before the act of torture. The paradoxical nature of the Prime Minister’s 
statement, which mirrors the nature of the idea of a necessity procedure, is 
reproduced once again; only a few paragraphs before the text quoted above, in the 
first clause of the letter, we find a reiteration of the (manifest) holding of Public 
Committee: “The government and the heads of GSS do not have the authority to set 
guidelines regarding the use of physical means in the interrogation of suspects.”67 To 
try and dispel the confusion, the Public Committee asked to receive a copy of the 
guidelines (1 November 2007). “Naturally,” wrote the government representative, it is 
impossible to reveal these guidelines which “detail, inter alia, the officials who partake 
in the procedure of consultation, the ways in which such consultation is documented, 
and  such issues that in essence are internal guidelines.”68 
                                                                                                                           
document is undisputed. Netan’el Benishu, vice president of the Ofer court-martial, wrote in 
his decision in Yaman’s case: “The fact that special means of interrogation was not concealed 
from the defense. It has obtained a document that can prove the use of such methods.” Id.   
65 Compare with Dershowitz’s suggestion to issue torture warrants. See ALAN 
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO 
THE CHALLENGE 110, 252 (2003); Alan Dershowitz, Torture Without Visibility and Accountability is 
Worse Than With It, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 326 (2003); Alan Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A 
Response to Professor Strauss, NYL SCH. L. REV., 275 (2003 – 2004).  
66 Motion on behalf of petitioners, supra note 51, app. 16 (copy of the letter). 
67 Id.  
68Id., app. 17. 
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 This impossibility, the government explains, stems from the fact the guidelines are 
classified. Below, we will show that the judiciary has also embraced this paradox, and 
reflect on where it comes from. We will argue that it has very clear historical roots in 
the military control of the West Bank and Gaza. But before that, another short 
intervention: even though they were not discussed in Public Committee, the way 
evidence is organized in security-related criminal procedures and the way criminal 
complaints about torture are handled are both essential parts of managing necessity.    
5. The Structure of “Covering Up” 
When discussing how torture was kept from public scrutiny following Public 
Committee, it is useful to return to the decision. As Justice Barak explained, the decision 
is not based on the full information on physical means of interrogation in Israel. 
Rather, its factual basis was limited to the materials that the petitioners provided– 
without full disclosure by the state.69  Two bodies of information were missing. One 
was a comprehensive catalogue of the methods of torture. The State agreed to expose 
this information to the court only ex-parte. As the petitioner did not approve of such a 
course of action, only the methods that the petitioners knew about (a very carnal 
knowledge) were discussed.  
The other body of unavailable evidence was the guidelines that outlined when the 
State would use torture. Here again, the State refused to expose this evidence in open 
court. The Court did, however, have a general idea what the guidelines looked like. 
As we will explain below, these were an early prototype of the Rubinstein guidelines, 
which were discussed many years earlier by the Landau Commission.  
The earlier guidelines, which were deemed illegal, are strikingly similar to the 
contemporary ones. This is how the ISC describes the guidelines: 
The decision to utilize physical means in a particular instance is based on internal 
regulations, which requires obtaining permission from the higher ranks of the GSS. 
The regulations themselves were approved by a special Ministerial Committee on GSS 
interrogations. Among other guidelines, the committee set forth directives regarding 
the rank required of an officer who was to authorize such interrogation practices. 
These directives were not examined by this Court.70  
Of course, we may pose the question of whether the ISC could (and should) have 
provided the petitioners with a remedy that would allow a procedure in which both 
sides could inspect all the relevant material. But regardless of whether the court could 
have done that, from the present point of view what must be emphasized is that such 
disclosure was never achieved. Thus, there was no fresh start, after which state efforts 
to “cover up” practices of torture would have to begin anew. Even publicly known 
and relevant methods of information control did not come under review.  
One practice that may have come under review in a fuller examination of the 
administrative mechanism fostering torture would have been the way evidence is 
                                                
69 Public Committee, supra note 1, at paragraph 8.   
70 Id.  
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organized in Israeli Military Courts. The manner in which we discussed the memo 
from the evidence in Bahjat Yaman’s case may have created the false impression that 
evidence of torture is readily available for defendants and defense attorneys. The 
original memo indicating the necessity procedure was indeed obtained from Yaman’s 
attorney, Mr. Labib Habib. Yet, Mr. Habib did not have a copy of this memo. When 
he requested one, he was only permitted to make a handwritten reproduction in the 
prosecutor’s office.71   
In order to understand the context in which a defense attorney confronts such a 
Kafkaesque demand, one must first understand the nature of the Military Court, the 
venue in which many of the “security” cases are heard in Israel.72  Located on the 
margins of the West Bank, these courts are military institutions, constituted by the 
power of the Emergency Ordinance (1946) inherited by Israel from the end of the 
British colonial period. Palestinians are tried there by soldiers for “security” crimes, 
which are defined quite broadly. Although most, if not all, of the crimes adjudicated 
in these courts are part of a national struggle for independence, the people tried there 
are not recognized as prisoners of war, but as common law defendants detained under 
special “security prisoner” status. A minority of cases are associated with terrorist 
bombings of civilian targets within Israel. Others include, for example, quasi-military 
actions in which Palestinian soldiers resisted the entry of the Israeli military into 
Palestinian cities; shootings and attempted shootings of settlers; arms trade on behalf 
of the Palestinian Authority, without permission from the Israeli government; and 
often times misdemeanors of minors such as throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. 
These procedures were historically the most tainted with torture, as shown by the 
Landau Commission (see below). The December 2007 report on the military courts 
published by the Israeli NGO Yesh Din reflects some of the serious concerns 
regarding their protection of the right to due process.73  Perhaps the most injurious 
aspect of these military procedures pertains to Mr. Habib’s difficulties obtaining 
evidence of torture. The report notes that “[i]n case of a defendant under 
interrogation by the GSS, the investigation material in many cases will not include the 
notes of the GSS interrogation.”74   But from our perspective, what is even more 
disturbing is that defense lawyers have to tolerate such notes at all. These are not 
                                                
71 The state never denied that Yaman was tortured; when writing his verdict, the military 
judge specified that information regarding "special interrogation methods" was brought to the 
defense’s knowledge in due form. BS JS 3029/05 Bahjat Fathi Youssef Yaman v. The Military 
Prosecutor (Petition for discovery of the information having to do with the interrogation of the 
petitioner and the main witness against him. The petition was denied. This material, which is 
a decision in a motion in a military court, remains unpublished and may be very difficult to 
obtain).  
72 For an ethnographic study of this venue see LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT (2005); 
For a report on procedural rights granted (and violated) in military courts see Yesh Din, 
Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the Occupied 
Territories (2007), available at www.yesh-din.org/site/images/BackyardProceedingsEng.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2010).   
73 Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings, supra note 72. 
74 Id., at 116.   
Vol. 6:59, 2010 MANN & SHATZ: THE NECESSITY PROCEDURE 79 
 
 
records of the interrogation; there is no statute specifying what must be included in 
them; they are written in shorthand and after the interrogation is over, as is 
completely clear reading the memo on Bahjat Yaman. They would surely not pass 
muster as police documentation, requiring word-per-word records signed by 
detainees, and sometimes visual and/or auditory records of interrogations. Thus, they 
obstruct the ability of defense lawyers to prove the abuse of their clients. In the case of 
Bahjat Yaman, for example, we do not get any idea what exactly has been done to 
him. If there is any documentation lying in closed drawers, defense lawyers have not 
been able to find out.  
In a scene from The Battle of Algiers, a scrawny young man sits stooped in a room 
crowded with French troops, his bare torso shiny with perspiration. “Now tell us what 
you told us before,” demands one of the Frenchmen, sticking a microphone in the 
Algerian’s face. The man sputters out his rank and position in the Front de Libération 
Nationale, the Algerian insurgent group the French military is trying to defeat. "Okay, 
that’s enough," responds the French soldier, and moves away quickly with the 
documented confession. The viewer easily fills the gap: confessions are first extracted 
by force; only after that, they are repeated and recorded, so as to be used in a trial. 
Meanwhile on the screen, the camera moves to the torture room. Belts and ropes tie 
male bodies askew.    
The similarity between the illicit practice portrayed in the classic war film and the 
procedure in Israel’s military courts is considerable, even if we don’t have the shot 
from the interrogation room. After the suspect is interrogated by the GSS, the officer 
fills in his shorthand memo of the interrogation. The detainee is then given over for a 
police interrogation, where he is ordered to repeat the statement he gave to the GSS 
officer.75  The police interrogator is equipped not only with his documentation 
devices, but also with the memo the GSS interrogator had written behind closed 
doors. What the Yesh Din report criticizes is that the GSS memos are often not 
included in the evidence material. But even when the memos are given to defense 
lawyers, they are designed to make it almost impossible to find real accounts of the 
stories their clients tell them.  
The division of labor between GSS interrogators and police documenters is not 
the only way administration is designed for impunity. Apart from criminal procedures 
in which the validity of confessions is disputed, information on torture might have 
come to light in the context of criminal complaints against GSS interrogators. As 
quoted above, the last available numbers that we know of recorded around 500 such 
criminal complaints since Public Committee. These did not yield one criminal 
indictment, or even one criminal interrogation. Only two interrogators were subject 
to disciplinary sanctions.76   
                                                
75 Motion on behalf of the petitioners supra note 51, at para. 113-120, and also app. 20, 
which is an affidavit by attorney Lea Tsemel describing the separate evidence materials. I’ve 
learned about this separation of evidence from first-hand practical experience.  
76 Id. at para. 130, and app. 22-23, which are copies of letters from the Israeli Ministry of 
Justice, in reply of a freedom of information inquiry about this issue. 
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Even if, as some have suggested, many complaints were unwarranted, it seems 
highly implausible that none of the 500 amount to criminal suspicions. The real reason 
for these statistics seems to lie in the compromised independence of the prosecution. 
When a victim of torture files a criminal complaint, it is passed to “the reviewer of 
complaints filed by people interrogated by the GSS.” This is the official is in charge of deciding 
on a possible indictment. The position is held by a senior GSS interrogator, who is 
given instructions by the AG office, but who continues to work under the GSS.77  The Israeli 
NGO B’Tselem has been extremely critical of this administrative structure, claiming 
among other things that it results in a substantively decreased number of 
complaints.78  
6. Judicial Complicity after Public Committee 
The central tenets of necessity management have been called into question in courts in 
two contexts. The first was in the area of criminal procedures, in which the 
admissibility of confessions was contested. The second was a contempt motion filed at 
the ISC to declare that the administrative use of a "necessity procedure" violates the 
holding of Public Committee. In both contexts, courts have refrained from intervening in 
the procedure. 
The existence of a procedure is rarely dealt with in criminal cases, even when the 
admissibility of confessions is challenged. However, in at least two such cases in the 
Jerusalem district court, the procedure came up and was upheld. One case in which 
this procedure left visible footprints is State of Israel v. Amro Al Aziz. Justice Segal 
expressly stated that: 
[The interrogators] implemented in the case of Ahmad an interrogation procedure, 
that is supposed to grant immunity by virtue of the necessity defense according to 
paragraph 34(11) of the Penal Law 5737(1977), which the G.S.S. interrogators call the 
“necessity interrogation” procedure. In court, Ahmad detailed the interrogatory means 
implemented against him, including physical pressure and threats (pp 113, 114–135), 
and in the primary examination and the cross examination, the interrogators even 
clarified the import of the means implemented including physical pressure (testimony 
labeled “Dotan” on pp. 142, 143, and 157).79 
                                                
77 B’TSELEM, UTTERLY FORBIDDEN 74-75 (2007). Available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/English/Publications/Summaries/200705_Utterly_Forbidden.asp 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2010) 
78 Id. at 76. “Against the background of the substantive defects inherent in this 
‘investigative’ mechanism, it may be held that the State of Israel is violating its obligation 
under international law to investigate suspected cases of torture and, where necessary, to 
prosecute the offenders.  Moreover, this mechanism sends . . . a clear message that the 
likelihood action will be taken against their abusers is negligible. The traces of this message are 
seen in the refusal . . .to file complaints, despite the legal advice  . . . Of the nine persons whom 
the organizations have contacted to date, four have refused the suggestion because of their 
total lack of faith in the investigative system.”  
79 TPH 775/04 State of Israel v. Amro Al Aziz (10.29.05, unpublished), at 59. See also id., 7. 
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Although “granting immunity” is seemingly contradictory to Justice Barak’s 
holding, the procedure was upheld and the statement in question was deemed 
admissible. Justice Noam, who also presided over the case, concurred on this point: 
“the interrogators viewed the means that they implemented, which they called 
‘necessity interrogation,’ as protected by virtue of the necessity defense according to 
paragraph 34(11) of the Penal Code.”80  
In November 2008 the necessity procedure was submitted for the review of the Israeli 
Supreme Court. Almost ten years after Justice Barak’s grand decision, the Public 
Committee Against Torture again challenged state practices of interrogation. 
Following Justice Barak’s decision in Public Committee, the organization filed the 
challenge as a motion for contempt. The claim was a very simple one: the very 
existence of a procedure negates the criminal protection of necessity and turns it into an 
authorization in advance. 
Justice Dorit Beynish, the current President of the ISC, based her summary 
dismissal of the motion on two propositions: (1) a motion for contempt was not the 
right procedure; (2) the plaintiff has not laid out a sufficient factual basis for “the 
severe claim that has been raised.” In light of the considerable evidence presented 
above, the decision seems to ignore well substantiated facts. This is particularly 
significant because the State did not dispute the existence of the procedure but 
contended that it was in line with Public Committee.   
Justice Beynish, however, found that a decision allowing institutionalized torture is 
a reasonable interpretation of Public Committee. As she explained, the motion for 
contempt was the wrong procedural avenue, precisely because deciding on this issue 
demands an interpretation of Public Committee, and is not simply and issue of applying the 
decision. The decisive paragraph in Public Committee Justice Beynish invokes includes 
the following statement: “we do not exclude the possibility that the protection of 
‘necessity’ will be awarded to a GSS interrogator, through the discretion of the AG in his 
decision if to prosecute, or, if he stands trial, through the discretion of the court.”81 
(emphasis added). Hence, it seems that the ISC is well aware of the function the 





                                                
80 See also, from the Sayd case: “From what was said it emerges that there was justification 
for holding the interrogation for many hours and even during the nighttime hours in terms of 
the importance and urgency of the matter. In the course of the interrogation, the accused was 
not deprived of sleep intentionally, for a period of time, as an end unto itself, and when the 
‘necessity interrogation’ ended the accused was allowed time to rest, with the purpose of not 
wearing him down" TPH 775/04 State of Israel v. Al Sayd (9.22.05, unpublished) (emphasis 
added). 
81 HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee against Torture v. State of Israel [2009] available at - 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/94/000/051/n15/94051000.n15.htm 
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Part II: The Landau Commission and Necessity Management 
1. Torture as Reasonably Foreseeable  
Given Justice Barak’s choice of words in Public Committee, continued torture can 
only be deemed reasonably foreseeable. Such predictability can also be demonstrated 
through a discussion of the historical context in which the decision was written.  In 
Part I, the application clause was in the center of our textual argument supporting this 
unhappy conclusion regarding Public Committee. As indicated towards the end of Part I, 
this realization is supported by a relatively recent ruling by the current ISC President, 
Justice Dorit Beynish.82 Building upon the fact of continued torture, this section will 
engage in a kind of reverse engineering of the decision, reflecting upon the historical 
conditions in which it became possible.   
An understanding that torture is particularly difficult to eradicate from 
institutional settings underlies the argument in our previous section. We hinted at this 
difficulty in the introduction, where we briefly discussed the incentive structure 
implied in Public Committee. Much of the existing literature on torture supports the 
assertion that torture has this “addictive” characteristic.83  Revisiting his classic 1978 
essay Torture, Henry Shue vividly describes this particular aspect of torture. Shue 
argues that the expectation that a state will follow norms requiring that torture be 
applied only in extreme situations is analogous to an expectation that an alcoholic 
would drink lightly; everyone knows that such a requirement is impossible, he 
explains.84   
Shue writes about post 9/11 America. In this environment, torture had returned, 
and its academic understanding has (perhaps) become more thorough. However, the 
presiding judges in Public Committee also recognized the potential slippery slope when 
they decided the case. The same idea is formulated very lucidly in the concluding part 
of the Landau Commission Report–which Public Committee rejected.85    
In 1987, the Landau Commission published a detailed report on the use of 
“physical pressure” in the GSS.86  This report is the obvious and most fundamental 
basis for any kind of historical contextualization of Public Committee. Its reasoning is 
rich, if sometimes baffling. Its arguments provide the intellectual source for the 
necessity procedure, and are early precursors of American attempts to legalize torture.  
In a discussion that recalls Shue’s image of the drunkard, the Commission 
describes an institutional dependency of the GSS on methods of torture.87  These 
                                                
82 Id.  
83 See Scheppelle, supra note 2; Shue, supra note 5.   
84 Shue, supra note 5, at 234. 
85 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 182.  
86 On the statutory framework pursuant to which the commission was created, see id. at 
146. 
87 Id. at 184: 
We are convinced that effective activity by the GSS to thwart terrorist acts is impossible 
without use of the tool of interrogation of suspects, in order to extract from them vital 
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claims of dependency by state officials required that the ISC give extra attention not 
only to the legal prohibition on torture, but also to the possible problems in applying 
the decision. However, such a prudential sensitivity does not exist in the application 
clause, which as we have shown was counterproductive to helping Israel recover from 
its habit. 
The Landau Commission Report doesn’t leave much room to doubt that a 
reasonable judge could have foreseen that the mere discussion of the question of 
necessity would open the way to physical abuse. Whether the protection of necessity 
should be available for interrogators is a longstanding debate.88   Pragmatically, the 
choice to discuss the question had quite identifiable probable results. Judicial decisions 
are (and should be) drafted not only in an application of the relevant norm to a set of 
facts, but also with view to the consequences of their promulgation and 
enforcement.89  To be sure, in order to decide on the merits, there was no need to 
reach a decision on the issue of necessity;90  the decision could easily have been written 
while leaving this contested issue to be argued in an actual criminal procedure against 
an interrogator who would be suspected or charged with a crime related to torture. 
Furthermore, if the court had taken seriously the foreseeable problems in 
administering its judgment, the procedural instruments would have been readily 
available. These could take the form of various injunctions, which could result in no 
less than restructuring practices of interrogation in the GSS.91   
It may very well be that the basic flaw in the argument from “necessity” in Public 
Committee is that it paints an imaginary representation, which has no existence in 
                                                                                                                           
information known only to them and unobtainable by other methods. The effective 
interrogation of terrorist suspects is impossible without use of means of pressure, in 
order to overcome an obdurate will not to disclose information and to overcome the 
fear of the person under interrogation that harm will befall him from his own 
organization, if he does reveal information. Interrogation of this kind is permissible 
under law, as we interpreted it above, and we think that a confession thus obtained is 
admissible in a criminal trial, under the existing rulings of the Supreme Court. 
88 This debate is hardly new. The language of the Lieber Code, one of the first codes of 
international crime, rejects torture under “military necessity:” “Military necessity does not 
admit of cruelty–that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of 
maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions”.  Notably, there is  
no mention of “interrogational torture” (Henry Shue’s term), which is considered to be the 
most prevalent variety  today (with a few reservations that we shall present).  For a normative 
argument against the recognition of such a protection see, e.g., McMahan, supra note 5 at 241-
248.  
89 Id. at 242.  
90 Justice Dieter Grimm of the German Constitutional Court, in a conversation at Yale 
Law School, made an interesting comparison with a German case, in which the Constitutional 
Court struck down a law permitting firing on an airplane overtaken by terrorists. As Grimm 
explained, the German court would not discuss whether shooting in such circumstances would 
provide for a defense of necessity. Rather, it decided to defer this question to when such an 
argument will actually come up.  
91 For a classical discussion of such remedies in the American context, see OWEN M. FISS, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).  
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reality. Regardless of its conceptual validity, and regardless of the further step Justice 
Barak makes with the application clause, this argument must also be understood as 
inviting a slippery slope. Scheppelle makes this point discussing the “ticking bomb” 
scenario as a hypothetical assuming “that you . . . and the terrorist are alone in the 
world.” (recall the condition of experience): 
The question, therefore, is not whether “you” as an individual should torture, but 
instead whether a nation should have a policy approving the use of torture – a very 
different moral matter. As a result, the question should be framed not [as] a matter of 
personal choice, but instead as a decision made by a professional interrogator who is 
following institutional rules.92  
Looking back at Israeli history, we find that in the rare instances when the 
question was framed in such an institutional manner, the answer was to authorize 
torture. This happened with Rubinstein’s memo, but before that–and very 
importantly–in the Landau Commission Report.  These two documents suggest that 
the shift in interrogation procedures was actually a very minor one. On a high level of 
generality, the mechanism of managing torture that appeared after Public Committee is 
the very mechanism the Landau Commission proposed: instead of open admission 
and perhaps even legislation (like the Commission suggested), it found its place in the 
inner workings of security bureaucracies.  
Although it does not use the word torture in describing Israeli practices, the 
Landau Report was the first official Israeli document to show that physical pressure 
was systematically used against detainees. Allegations of torture of Palestinian 
detainees were voiced before the report was published, but this was doubtlessly the 
deepest and fullest examination of such practices to date.93  Justifiably or not, the 
Commission’s composition and its motivations lent it undisputed credibility. The fact 
that the report dates the beginning of torture to the occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza intimately ties this practice to the form of military control that had developed in 
these areas. And the fact that the report was published just before the first Intifada 
shows that torture was practiced before the Palestinian population rose against Israeli 
control. This, of course, raises doubts about the traditional framing of the torture issue 
as emerging in the face of insurgency or popular resistance, and suggests that it may 
have been a regular strategy of control.  
Two public scandals implicating the GSS in illicit treatment of detainees led to the 
decision to establish the Commission, headed by former ISC Justice Moshe Landau. 
One involved the torture of Izat Nafsu, a Circassian Israeli military officer, who had 
been convicted of treason.94  The other involved the murder of two Palestinian 
detainees who hijacked a bus–and the subsequent cover-up of the story.95   
                                                
92 Scheppele, supra note 2, at 294. 
93 Hajjar, supra note 72 at 68 – 70. 
94 See CA 124/87 Izat Nafsu v. Chief Military Prosecutor [1987] IsrSC 51(2) 631. 
95 See The Landau Report, supra note 14 at148; Hajjar, supra note 72, at 70. 
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The report harshly condemned the scandals, emphasizing the disastrous damage 
they caused to the public image of the GSS as a law-abiding security service.96  While 
the report reflects an “understanding” of the need to use “moderate physical 
pressure,” it expresses moralistic alarm at what it describes as a practice of systematic 
perjury by GSS interrogators who testify on the interrogation of Palestinian detainees:  
The revelation of this method increased the crisis of confidence in the GSS’s moral 
fiber, which had begun earlier, and it is undermining the sense of self-confidence and 
self respect of every GSS officer. This evil must be eradicated, for it is a matter of life 
and death for us all, in the full sense of the term.97   
After providing no less than an “essential catharsis”98  purging the GSS from the 
former practices of perjury, the report recommends a framework for the legalization 
of “moderate physical pressure.”99  
Reading the report from a contemporary perspective helps explain where the 
three central aspects of necessity management had come from: (1) the scheme of 
“confirmations and consultations,” (2) the idea that the criminal doctrine of necessity 
can be applied within an administrative procedure to be outlined in a document, and 
(3) the mechanisms for covering up the evidence of torture. All of these did not appear 
out of thin air. Long before Rubinstein could write his memo on Justice Barak’s 
application clause, the basic tenets of the necessity procedure were well in place.  
2. Historical Continuities: Confirmations and Consultations    
 
Although in its conclusion the report does recommend legalizing torture, it is far 
from endorsing arbitrary violence against detainees. The report recognizes that 
violence has been systematically deployed against Palestinian detainees, and asserts 
that such violence is irreplaceable by other means of interrogation. It is thus an early 
example of a highly creative project, one that later gained substantive momentum in 
the U.S. under the Bush administration: a project of containing torture within the rule 
of law. “Physical pressure,” writes the commission, was generally kept to the 
minimum necessary level; recognizing it legally is understood as a safeguard for 
keeping it that way.  
In line with its particular concern with the development of regularized perjury, the 
Commission was truly concerned with uncontrolled, spontaneous violence inflicted on 
detainees by individual interrogators in a sporadic manner. “Strict care must be 
taken, lest a breach of the structure of prohibitions of the criminal law bring about a 
loosening of the reins,”100  it warns. The two public scandals that preceded the 
decision to establish the Commission were understood as such eruptions of chaotic 
                                                
96 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 148.  
97 Id. at148 – 149.  
98 Id. at 149.  
99 Id.   
100 Id. at 174. 
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and localized violence. The obstructions of attempts to investigate these events are 
thus interpreted as direct and natural extensions of this kind of truly abhorrent 
violence against detainees and as their embodiment in the public sphere.  
A fascinating aspect of this aversion towards unregulated violence is the way it is 
fraught with allusions to totalitarian regimes in which such violence prevails.101  This 
is particularly astonishing when contrasted with an alternative understanding of 
totalitarianism, which tends to emphasize uncompromising rule-following as its 
central facet. Hannah Arendt famously demonstrates such an understanding in her 
account of the Eichmann trial in which she portrays the defendant as the 
paradigmatic follower of orders from above.102   
It is reasonable to believe that the Commission was intimately acquainted with 
such a view of totalitarianism. The head of the Commission, former Justice Landau, 
was the same Justice Landau who presided over the court in the Eichmann trial, the 
same Justice Landau who, as Arendt noted, had “led his colleagues to use their 
German Mother tongue with Eichmann.”103   Again, The Battle of Algiers provides an 
illuminating illustration of what’s at stake. Recall the French protagonist of the film, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu. When asked about torture in a press conference, 
Mathieu provides an explanation of why the black letter of the law sometimes should 
not be followed. The officer recalls his previous career fighting Nazis, presumably the 
most salient example of the dangers of strict rule-following. On one thing, however, 
he is in agreement not only with Justices Landau and Barak, but also with 
contemporary US official discourse: “we do not use the word torture.”104  
The Commission’s political logic, however, demanded that the State not only take 
responsibility for violence (a result which Justice Barak lays on the shoulders of an 
individual like Mathieu), but also establish a more solid monopoly on violence. Such a 
monopoly is understood as a trope of democracy (against totalitarianism). 
                                                
101 See, e.g., id, at 163. For a discussion of comparable attempts judges in the US had made 
to distinguish themselves from totalitarianism, see Judith Resnik, Detention, The War on Terror and 
the Federal Courts: An Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan, COLUM. L. REV., 149 (forthcoming). 
102 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
(Viking Press 1971) (1963). 
103 Id. at 4.  
104 Years later, John Yoo made use of this omission of the word torture in his analysis of 
Public Committee, Jay Bybee, Memorandum for A. Gonzales Re: Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C.  §§2340-2340A (Dep’t of Justice August 1, 2002): 
While the Israeli Supreme Court concluded that these acts amounted to cruel and 
inhuman treatment, the court did not expressly find that they amounted to torture. To 
be sure, such a conclusion was unnecessary because even if the acts amounted only to 
cruel and inhuman treatment the GSS lacked authority to use the five methods. 
Nonetheless, the decision is still best read as indicating that the acts at issue did not 
constitute torture. The court’s description of and conclusions about each method 
indicate that the court viewed them as merely cruel, inhuman or degrading but not of 
the sufficient severity to reach the threshold of torture. While its descriptions discuss 
necessity, dignity, degradation, and pain, the court carefully avoided describing any of 
these acts as having the severity of pain or suffering indicative of torture.  
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Like Public Committee, the Landau Report also paints Israeli interrogation 
procedures in heroic colors. Here, however, the heroism is quite different. Instead of 
the revolutionary GSS interrogator working single-handedly to defend society, risking 
not only life and limb, but also personal reputation, we get the heroism of the State.105   
This is an impersonal order of power which can be reduced to the pure enforcement 
of the law.106  When the Commission strikes dramatic chords with expressions such as 
“eradicating evil,” or the “life and death for us all,” it speaks in the name of what is 
perceived to be a united polity, for which enforcement is not merely a question of 
security, but also an expression of values. Where Justice Barak later positioned an 
individual who is forced to act immediately in the face of a nerve-racking moral 
dilemma, the Commission posits the nation.107  Such a vision of unity is in considerable 
tension with the fact that the victims of torture are as a general rule not members of the 
polity. This high-ground of moral rhetoric at the expense of non-citizens is 
symptomatic of colonial regimes. The unquestionable faith in “the rule of law” 
provided the justification for state violence against “others.”108  As we will show below, 
the Commission had to grapple with this problem in its assessment of torture; 
however, it didn’t go so far as to discuss the contradiction between the identity of the 
tortured and its image of unity.     
Individual interrogators, on the other hand, are for the Commission first and 
foremost hard workers and devoted public servants. “The investigation staff of the 
GSS is characterized by professionalism, devotion to duty, readiness to undergo 
exhausting working conditions at all hours of the day and night and to confront 
physical danger, but above all by high inner motivation to serve the nation . . .”109  
Their perjury and cover-ups are understood as the faltering behavior of a good boy, 
who has gone ahead and done something that he should have asked permission for.110   
At the same time, interrogators are thought of as post-traumatic patients who 
deserve sympathy for their abandonment by the polity and by law. This 
abandonment is what made them resort to lying. The Commission’s reasoning for 
adopting interrogation procedures that will openly employ torture is thus couched in 
a therapeutic language. It is formulated so that GSS interrogators “may be able to 
                                                
105 Whereas life and limb can be translated into (celebrated) sacrifice, willingness to risk 
personal reputation is precisely the willingness to risk that potential. For a phenomenology of 
sacrifice in the “War on Terror,” see Kahn, supra note 2, 101–119.  
106 Paul Kahn considers Justice Barak’s decision (and not the Landau Commission Report) 
precisely as such a reduction of power to law enforcement. But which of the two positions 
engages in such a reduction? Perhaps both do, although in different ways. Supra note 3, at 19.  
107 In this respect, the commission’s vision seems to be more realistic. See Scheppelle, supra 
note 2, at 294, 307. 
108 For a comparison with the French/Algerian context, see MacMaster, supra note 19, at 6.  
109 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 148.  
110 Id.: “It is all the more painful and tragic that a group of persons like this failed severely 
in its behavior as individuals and as a group. In saying this we are not referring to the methods 
of interrogation they employed – which are largely to be defended, both morally and legally . . 
. but to the method of giving false testimony in court, a method which has now been exposed 
for all to see and which deserves utter condemnation.” 
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overcome the feelings of distress and anxiety due to the burden of the past that weighs 
on them.”111  
Rubinstein’s implementation of the application clause, based on consultations and 
confirmations grows from this logic, which juxtaposes the unity of a polity defending its 
life with the need to embrace interrogators in legal assurances. Spreading mens rea up 
the administrative ladder is conditioned upon understandings of the state and of the 
interrogator which are first articulated not in Public Committee, but that already appear 
the Landau Commission Report. This is the main historical continuity that connects 
the whole period in question, from 1987 to 2009.    
However, the Commission does not invent these categories. Its reasoning flows 
from the needs of military control that developed in the West Bank and Gaza after 
their occupation by Israel in 1967. Once again, the particularities of how 
confirmations and consultations took place in the GSS since 1967 remain classified. 
They are described in the second part of the report, which was not published, and 
which has not been revealed. But regardless of the specificities, the report doesn’t 
conceal the fact that such norms were at work since the military control began. The 
reader learns that since 1967 “permissions” were given “from time to time to employ 
means of pressure;”112  these were juxtaposed with consultations, which are described 
as a “constant examination of the effectiveness of such methods, as against their 
necessity.”113  The regulations are mutable, reminding us of the dynamic nature of 
norms under the necessity procedure. “Permitted methods” were in place, even if 
admittedly there were some “deviations” from them;114  and finally, they were all 
subject to review from above.115  The following paragraph encapsulates many of the 
important features of the normative model inherited from the reality described by the 
Landau Report. Hierarchy, secrecy, mutability, and the relation of these to the 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza are all discussed very frankly:  
GSS interrogators should be guided by setting clear boundaries in this matter, in order 
to prevent the use of inordinate physical pressure arbitrarily administered by the 
interrogator. As is set out in detail in the second part of this Report, guidelines 
concerning such boundaries have existed in the service ever since the scope of 
investigation of HTA [“Hostile Terrorist Activity”] was expanded, as required by the 
new situation following the Six Days War. These guidelines underwent occasional 
changes, generally in the directions of restrictions on the use of physical force, which 
were imposed from time to time at the initiative of the political echelon, until today the 
                                                
111 Id. at 149: "We regard our principal function as being to guide the essential process of 
rehabilitation and healing with regard to the GSS activity on HTA, by integrating this vital 
activity into the framework of the values of the rule of law which the state of Israel espouses."  
112 Id. at 158. 
113 Id. at 158; Notice how close the language is to that of Prime Minister Olmert’s letter 
quoted above.  
114 Id. at 159 
115 Id.  
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authorization of physical contact with the person under interrogation is extremely 
limited.116 
The Landau Commission Report, Public Committee, and the current regime of 
necessity management have important commonalities. At all three junctures, Israel 
admitted the existence of guidelines but concealed their content. At all three points in 
time we are told that torture, when applied, is being implemented through a structure 
of rule-following. The Landau Commission derives this structure from the custom of 
interrogators under military control in the West Bank. From there it morphed onto 
Rubinstein’s conceptualization of “confirmations and consultations.” From 1967 
onwards, we are presented with an asymptotic curve measuring the amount of torture 
applied. The triumphant, enlightened narrative in the excerpt above from the Landau 
Report is that of the ongoing gravitation towards a measure of zero torture. But 
importantly, this curve will never touch zero; it is not meant to touch zero, and it 
logically cannot.   
German Jurist Karl Von Savigny famously argued that “[l]aw comes into being 
through custom and popular acceptance, through internal, silently working forces and 
not through the arbitrariness of the law giver.”117  Paraphrasing his maxim, we now 
find a normative system that came from the internal, silently working forces of the law 
giver himself.  
3. Historical Discontinuities: Necessity as Law 
As emphasized above, the necessity procedure and the analysis of the doctrine of 
necessity in Public Committee are seemingly incongruent, or even contradictory. 
Whereas Justice Barak reiterates the conditions of experience and temporality, the 
procedure utilizes the application clause in order to introduce a forward-looking version 
of necessity; we thus saw that according to the Israeli government’s current position, 
torture can be authorized ex-ante by high-ranking officials. Yet it remains an illegal, 
even if un-prosecuted, practice.  
While it is clear why the executive took into account the application clause in 
order to create a bureaucratic mechanism for such authorization, it is less clear why 
the concept of “necessity” is reintroduced. This is especially curious since the 
application clause does not require the AG to make any findings on necessity in his 
expansive prosecutorial discretion. A procedure that would not allude to “necessity” 
at all would suffice for the government to declare that “guidelines have been 
followed.” Why use terminology that accentuates the contradiction between the 
actual practices and Justice Barak’s formulation of necessity as a judgment that can be 
made only after the fact? 
Here too, the executive has reverted back to ideas that were established by the 
Landau Commission well before Public Committee. As we have shown, the general point 
is not that torture should be stopped, but that it should be applied as little as possible. 
                                                
116 Id. at 184–5.  
117 KARL VON SAVIGNY, THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE, 30 (Abraham Hayward trans., 2007)(1831).  
90 UNBOUND Vol. 6:59, 2010 
 
 
Contrary to the consultations scheme, which according to the Landau Commission is 
as old as the occupation itself, some original statutory interpretation which the 
commission undertook comes into play here. A considerable portion of the report is 
devoted to statutory analysis of section 22 (at the time) of the Israeli Penal Code, 
which formulated the protection of necessity under Israeli criminal law. The 
Commission’s own understanding is that its analysis is of groundbreaking (and 
implicitly international) importance in the field of anti-terrorism law.118  
Relying on what is essentially a proportionality analysis, the Commission reaches 
the conclusion that the prohibition on torture is not absolute, but rather relative.119  
Indeed this brand of legal reasoning is reflected in the very euphemism the 
Commission coined for torture: “moderate physical pressure.” As the Commission 
explains, applying such pressure requires three conditions:120  (1) action has been 
taken to prevent grievous harm to the detainee, his “honor,”121  a third party, or 
property; (2) it is impossible to prevent an anticipated harm in any other way; and (3) 
no more than reasonably necessary pressure was applied. 
A fourth condition, which is rejected by the Commission, is that of immediacy. 
Under this condition, “the defence of necessity is not applicable except when, because 
of the time factor, the danger is liable to be realized immediately, and therefore it is 
essential to get the information immediately from the suspect.” This, however, “is not 
our opinion,” writes the Commission, explaining that “the section itself makes no 
mention of such qualification; rather, it is built entirely upon the idea of ‘the concept 
of lesser evil’.” Thus, “the harm done by violating a provision of the law during an 
interrogation must be weighed against the harm to the life or person of others which 
could occur sooner or LATER”(upper-case in the original).122 Note the close relation 
between Justice Barak’s conditions of experience and temporality and the condition of 
immediacy, which was rejected by the Commission.  
Only after eliminating this concept, and reiterating its replacement by “the 
concept of lesser evil,” does the Commission move to the legal analysis of 
prerequisites for applying “moderate physical pressure.” It therefore seems that the 
concept of lesser evil remains the most important one, while all the others are merely 
reformulations or subsets of it.123  As Neil MacMaster has shown, this reasoning has a 
                                                
118 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 167: "In our opinion, great importance attaches to 
the defence . . . of "necessity" in sec. 22 of the Penal Law, where the GSS investigator’s 
criminal responsibility is concerned. The significance of this defence in the special context of 
activities designed to foil terrorist acts has not yet been considered in an Israeli court ruling. In 
other judicial systems, in the common law world outside it, we found a discussion of it in legal 
literature, but there, too, the Courts have not yet expressed their opinion on it in this context, 
as far as we know. . . " 
119 On the problems with proportionality analysis in this context, see Scheppelle, supra note 
2, at 313. 
120 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 169. 
121 This would normally be translated to English as "dignity."  
122 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 171. 
123 Arendt argued against the idea of the lesser evil, which she argues can make ordinary 
people participate in evil policies. As she puts it, "those who chose the lesser evil forgot very 
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very particular genealogy in the context of torture; like the ticking bomb scenario, it 
originates from the French-Algerian colonial context.124   
This conclusion is in conflict with Justice Barak’s emphasis on the need for 
immediacy, as well as with other popular understandings based on the iconic “ticking 
time bomb” scenario. Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu, who can now be consulted yet a 
third time, explains that the need for the (unmentioned) torture is based on the fact 
that the Front de Libération Nationale instructs its people not to talk for 24 hours.125  
During this time, the organization makes internal changes in order to render obsolete 
any information that might have been revealed. Torture and time are thus linked not 
only through the image of the ticking bomb, but also because of the dynamic nature 
of insurgency. That is not the case for the Landau Commission, which views torture 
from a disembodied god’s eye and relocates temporally disparate events, placing them 
on opposite sides of a utilitarian formula. This formula, in turn, is conceptualized as 
an incarnation of the values of honesty and decency:       
The deciding factor is not the element of time, but the comparison between the gravity 
of the two evils–the evil of contravening the law as opposed to the evil which will occur 
sooner or later; and as was stated above, weighing these two evils, one against the 
other, must be performed according to the concepts of morality implanted in the heart 
of any decent and honest person.126  
As opposed to the hierarchy of permits described in the report, which was adapted 
quite straightforwardly by the contemporary management regime, the traces of this 
doctrinaire analysis are more difficult to find. This is not surprising, as it is a corollary 
of the conception of torture as illegal but merely unprosecuted. The decision not to 
indict, however, uses the Commission’s recommendations as derived from its 
proportionality analysis: as long as torture is “lite,” it is possible to use disciplinary 
instead of criminal sanctions. As we have seen, disciplinary sanctions have come to 
displace criminal sanctions as the most severe sanctions applied in these cases. 
4. The History of Covering Up 
Tracing the history of the displacement of criminal sanctions for disciplinary ones, 
we have already gained insight into two of the mechanisms of “covering up.” One is 
the Attorney General’s failure to investigate complaints, which is conditioned upon 
internal, disciplinary sanctions. The other is the consistent pattern of guidelines and 
methods of torture remaining covert. But if torture was always so “lite,” why are its 
methods not revealed? Perhaps the regime constituted by torture does not truly 
depend on actual contact with the detainee’s body, but primarily on imagination. 
When the real currency exchanged in the give and take of the interrogation room is 
                                                                                                                           
quickly that they chose evil." HANNAH ARENDT, RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT 36-37 
(2005).   
124 MacMaster, supra note 19, at 8.  
125 Rejali describes this historical context, supra note 43, at 480 – 486.  
126 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 174. 
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not of pain but of emotion–terror–making torture work demands the active fantasy of 
what might be coming next.127  This is the logic underlying the assertion of “the 
impossibility of employing these methods in the future, once they have been made 
known to the adversary,” which may explain the interconnectedness between the 
logic of proportionality and the need to keep secrets; with intensified fear it may also 
be possible to apply relatively lesser pain.128  The utilization and manipulation of such 
fear is thus another aspect of torture that has been ubiquitous at least since 1987.     
The Landau Commission Report also sheds light on the emergence of the 
exceptional practice of undocumented GSS interrogations. Whereas the Commission 
lays blame on the GSS for committing regularized perjury, the interrogators’ 
awareness of the need for true confessions is presented as a redeeming factor.129  The 
interrogators that the Commission interviewed did not fail to impress it with their 
meticulousness in preventing false confessions:   
The GSS personnel declared to us, with a hint of pride, that they had been extremely 
scrupulous in ensuring that any confession presented to the Court would be a truthful 
one, whatever the means used in obtaining it. Never, they explained to us, was such a 
confession brought before the court before it was examined and verified by other 
intelligence sources, including sources that could not be brought before the court.130   
The Commission did not find these statements by GSS interrogators to be merely 
persuasive. Alongside the strict conduct guidelines set from above, they are 
understood by the Commission as the very thing that separates, “as far as East from 
West,” GSS methods from “the notorious methods of the secret police in certain 
totalitarian states.”131  GSS interrogations seem to be understood as a quasi-court, 
even better than the real thing. They provide the judge with a ready-made truth.132  
The niceties of evidence rules, which limit the court’s ability to probe and reach the 
                                                
127 The fact the methods of torture remain secret can have a terrorizing effect both on the 
detainee and on his group of affinity, as the worse method is always perceived as something 
that is yet to come. David Luban writes that “a practice that exists to make it easier to subdue 
and tyrannize people is fundamentally hostile to liberals’ political philosophy.” But concealing 
the methods of torture brings torture practiced in liberal democracies close in function (even if 
not in intensity) to torture practiced in despotic regimes. See Luban, supra note 2, 1433.  
128 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 22. 
129 The following analysis of the way the GSS elicited confessions in interrogations 
employing torture sheds a different light on previous accounts, which tended to 
underemphasize confessions, assuming that torture was employed predominantly in the 
context of forward-looking interrogations aimed to extract intelligence. Compare, e.g., with 
Amand, supra note 13, at 656.  
130 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 163. 
131 Id. 
132 Foucault writes about a very different historical context, but along similar lines: “The 
magistrate constituted, in solitary omnipotence, a truth by which he invested the accused; and 
the judges received this truth ready made, in the form of documents and written statements; 
for them, these factors alone were proof; they met the accused only once in order to question 
him before passing sentence.” FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 35.  
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truth, are circumvented; truth-producing mechanisms that cannot be introduced in 
court–and in fact cannot even be mentioned straightforwardly–can be utilized. Thus, 
the Commission is led to believe that this did not yield false convictions (or perhaps 
decides to simply leave that possibility unmentioned): “there were cases where 
investigators had full confessions of persons under interrogation which were not 
presented in court, because the interrogators were uncertain about their veracity. 
Never, one of the investigators testified before us, did I feel that I was putting an 
innocent person into prison.”133  
Instead of accepting these assertions of the truth of the outcomes of interrogations 
as a defense for the GSS interrogators, the Commission could doubtlessly have seen 
them as part of the problem. For as much as it is a defense, it is in the same breath an 
annulment of the most fundamental principles of due process. The suspect does not 
have a right to present a defense, and no kind of separation of powers is observed. 
Grotesquely, the suspect is expected to simply rely on those who have tortured him to 
prevent his wrongful conviction.  
After Public Committee, the GSS interrogators’ statements may seem irrelevant; after 
all, the conclusions of the Commission were rejected. But the evidentiary system, in 
which the defense is expected to believe the interrogator that he will enumerate in his 
shorthand memo all the illicit means of interrogation he had performed, preserves the 
same underlying assumptions.  
Furthermore, the GSS’s purported goal of preventing false convictions is in 
irreducible tension with other statements in the report reflecting modes of operation 
that by no means emphasize truth finding. Hence, the Commission explains that as 
opposed to the police, who prioritize investigating crimes, the GSS considers this 
merely a secondary objective, which it was unwittingly assigned after the military 
occupation began.134  For the GSS, the main objective is not backward-looking 
investigation of crimes already committed, but forward-looking: the foiling of terrorist 
plots. The Commission realizes the tension between foiling terrorism and the 
requirements of a trial. It therefore explains that the GSS has an independent interest 
in trials, which can also be considered victories when they prevent the next attack. 
One of the interrogators explained how this works: “From our point of view, 
obviously, the fact that the accused is convicted and jailed is part of the foiling 
process. The foiling element takes the form of the offender being ‘neutralized’ for the 
X years of his imprisonment. That is definitely foiling . . .”135  
It is not difficult to see, however, how such reasoning could increase the risk of 
false convictions. If the prison sentence is understood as serving the purpose of 
punishment, it is important to convict the person who committed the crime. 
Sentences cannot exceed legal limitations, which ostensibly reflect societal 
understandings of the gravity of the crime. These boundaries are unclear when the 
prison sentence is instead a form of forward-looking preventive detention; here, the 
objective is to put the defendant behind bars, regardless of punishment 
                                                
133 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 162. 
134 Id. at 156. 
135 Id. at 156.  
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considerations. Clearly, a procedure in which interrogation methods are 
undocumented would make such a result more probable.136   
The Commission addresses quite straightforwardly the way evidence is organized 
so as to conceal the initial interrogation, in which the suspect’s version first emerges. 
This practice, it explains, is entrenched in the traditions of the GSS from time 
immemorial. Again, it is presented as a byproduct of the same subordination of 
criminal justice to security. Notice that the police officer is expected to take the 
suspect’s confession, rather than question or interrogate him.  
GSS personnel have never engaged in taking down such confessions. They interrogate 
the accused in their interrogation premises, when the main effort is directed toward 
inducing the accused to show readiness to give information and in the process to admit 
to the acts attributed to him. Once this stage has been completed successfully and the 
suspect is actually ready to confess, he is handed over to a police investigator who takes 
down his confession in accordance with the law. This confession is subsequently 
presented in court by the policeman who took it down, and who appears as witness for 
the prosecution.137   
As shown above, this method of interrogation has remained unchanged in the 
regime of necessity management following Public Committee, and is in place to this day. 
While it would arguably be objectionable for a judge to simply strike down this well-
established division of labor, the decision could have taken this into account 
somehow. As the report shows, it has been an essential part of the legal conditions for 
systematized abuse of detainees since the beginning of the occupation; thus, it must 
also be considered as an essential part of the prudential considerations on how to do 
away with such abuse. Ignoring this division of labor, on the other hand, has allowed 
the world the Commission described to remain very much a part of the Israeli 
criminal justice system.   
Just how deep the separation between security and normal police realities runs can 
be seen in the importance the Commission attaches to the confessions obtained by 
GSS interrogators.138  Whereas in criminal investigations, the police normally will 
                                                
136 Dershowitz accepts uncritically the proposition that there were no false convictions. 
Dershowitz, supra note 24, at 194.  
137 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 159. 
138 The Israel Supreme Court has often struggled with the separation between “criminal” 
law and “security” law, often demanding a modicum of autonomy for the criminal procedure 
from security procedures. As  Justice Rivlin recently stated:  
We are dealing here with interrogations of criminal suspects. The framework in which 
detention is demanded is a criminal framework. Granted, these are special materials that 
present special challenges, but that does not mean that we are to ignore the fact that 
the suspect is interrogated about his own involvement in security crimes. During the 
interrogation he may be asked forward-looking questions on possible future terrorist 
activities. However, the meaning of this is not that this is merely a ‘foiling detention,’ 
because the interrogation and the detention depend on grounds that relate to his own 
involvement in security crimes. For this matter, he is a suspect. His rights as a criminal 
suspect must therefore be observed. 
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have access to a variety of sources of evidence, the Commission explains that under 
military control the only available source of evidence is the suspect. Whereas law 
abiding citizens generally perceive the solving of crimes to be in their interests, the 
GSS operates in hostile terrain:  
[E]ye witnesses to acts of terrorism, such as the murder of a Jew in an Arab area, are 
unwilling to assist the investigators and generally even provide cover for the 
perpetrators because of the local population’s sympathy for and fear of the terrorists. 
Only rarely is the perpetrator of a terrorist act caught red-handed.139  
Here the confession is not a truth-producing mechanism, and it is not applied, as it 
were, as an instrument of producing disciplined subjects.140  The suspect is expected to 
confess, but there is no expectation of an expression of remorse or of an 
internalization of the values of the polity; individual responsibility, which is normally 
at center stage in criminal trials, is not at all what is put to question. The criminal is 
not expected to reenter the community that judged him. As John Langbein shows, 
torture used to be indispensible in the common law criminal justice system, as there 
was no other way to establish a conviction without multiple eye witnesses.141  Torture 
seems to have come back to that predominant position, as once again, confessions 
have become the only way to solve a case.   
The Commission does not tackle the possible problems this may cause for 
enunciations in the name of a united polity “eradicating evil:” such enunciations may 
be voiced in the name of the citizens, but they cannot be ascribed to the subjects of this 
system of criminal law.142  The "security" the commission is speaking of is related 
more to the friend/enemy distinction than to a discourse on membership and public 
deliberation.143  The justice system remains afflicted by the distinctions between us 
                                                                                                                           
See BSP 8823/07 Unidentified v. State of Israel [2010], available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/07/230/088/p25/07088230.p25.htm (Hebrew, accessed Oct. 
31, 2010). 
139 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 157 
140 The terminology is taken from FOUCAULT, supra note 19.  
141 John Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978 – 1979). See also 
Luban, supra note 2, at 1435. 
142 For the meaning of the differentiation between these two terms in the post-colonial 
context, see generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY 
AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996).  
143 This is an allusion to Carl Schmitt’s conceptualization of the friend/enemy distinction: 
“The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost intensity of a union or separation, of 
an association or dissociation . . . [the enemy] is, in a specially intense way, existentially 
something different and alien, so that in extreme cases conflicts with him are possible.” See 
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (trans. George Schwab, 1996) (1932). For 
a contemporary reading of this classic work of political theory see PAUL KAHN, THE CONCEPT 
OF SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
(forthcoming).   
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and them–while each group’s security is the other group’s risk.144  And justice 
becomes the extension of war–by other means.145   
In such a world, the moral repugnance often expressed regarding torture–which is 
sometimes imagined to be anchored in a more general moral principle of not harming 
the helpless–seems to take a totally different form.146  The suspect is merely an 
extension of a greater group, which, at the moment of interrogation, is waging bitter 
war. Alan Dershowitz identified this belligerent conceptualization. While accepting 
the Commission’s conclusion that torture should be brought into the realm of law, he 
strongly rejected its reliance on the doctrine of necessity.147 Evoking a particularly 
vivid image for this war, he aptly asks: “what if a suspected terrorist decides to resist 
the ‘physical pressures’ of his interrogators by physical countermeasures designed to 
protect his honor or person–i.e., what if he fights back? Could he defend himself 
against assault charges by invoking ‘necessity?’”148   
Does this kind of lawfare follow through to the contemporary regime of necessity 
management? First, it must be noted that the duality of functions at play in the report, 
which skips between intelligence interrogation and criminal investigation, is still very 
much present. The two kinds of interrogation are undifferentiated when leading to 
the courtrooms in the West Bank, and they are undifferentiated for detainees who are 
kept in custody by American forces but cannot be tried because they were too severely 
tortured.  Even if, as David Luban argues, liberal democracies will only agree to 
consider torture for intelligence purposes,149  when they do employ torture they will 
unavoidably have to cope with confessions as well.  Thus, in the contemporary necessity 
management regime, courts indeed function as direct extensions of “security.”150    
This is a reality in which torture is prohibited and maybe reduced but not 
abolished; in which all the administrative instruments of torture are in place; in which 
defendants are systematically denied GSS interrogation evidence; and in which 
despite all of these concerns, international public opinion celebrates the Israeli 
                                                
144 As Paul Kahn writes about Nazi Germany, what we see here is "administration" that 
was "made to serve the ends of the political". Id.   
145 “It is quite possible that war is the continuation of politics by other means, but isn’t 
politics itself a continuation of war by other means?” writes Michel Foucault, inverting a 
famous assertion by war historian Carl Von Clausewitz. MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY 
MUST BE DEFENDED:” LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1975 – 1976, 48 (trans. 
David Macey, 2003). 
146 For an explication of the moral prohibition on torture along these lines see Shue, supra 
note 6, at 125.  
147 See Dershowitz, supra note 24. 
148 Id. at 198. Dershowitz, however, does not differentiate between “terrorists” and “rock 
throwers” in this context.  
149 Luban, supra note 5, at 1436. 
150 Recently, the Israeli government reiterated the argument that security investigators 
have access to fewer sources of evidence, and therefore should be allowed to use tougher 
means of investigation. See discussion in BSP 8823/07 Unidentified v. State of Israel, supra 
note 137.  
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rejection of torture. Such a reality can only be conceived of as an embodiment of 
warfare.  
Part III: The Political Structure of Un-prosecution 
1. Secret Norms 
In a study of torture during the military control of the West Bank, Lisa Hajjar 
writes that after Public Committee, torture in Israel did not stop. Nevertheless, she 
writes, “the decision deprived practitioners of the cover of law.”151  It now seems that 
this is only partially true. Even if pushing torture outside the legal order has reduced 
the incidence of torture, it has simultaneously pushed any remedies further outside the 
reach of the victims. As much as it deprived the practitioners of the cover of law, it 
deprived torture victims of the protection of the justice system.  
A system of authorization very similar to the one proposed by the Landau 
Commission was established in Israel. However, contrary to the Commission’s 
recommendations, it was not based on statute, but on a very particular kind of 
administrative regulation that remains classified. The well-known democratic 
shortcomings of administrative regulations can tell only a small part of the story. An 
exceptional space was created: an area recognized as one of state criminality, but 
protected from state enforcement.  We have tried to show that this strange space often 
reflects (and affects) the precarious legal status not only of the victims of torture, but of 
Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza at large; people who are not citizens but 
nevertheless are effectively subjects of enduring Israeli military control.152  
Paul Kahn takes Justice Barak’s decision in Public Committee as a quintessential 
example of the displacement of politics by law.153  Contrary to what we may have 
seemed to suggest, we do not mean to make the opposite assertion, reducing law to 
politics (or war). Such an inversion is impossible, precisely because these distinctions 
may no longer be workable–particularly in the context of military control over a 
civilian population. What we find is a legal pluralism in which legislation, case law, 
and stealthy regulations, apparently in contradiction with one another, are woven 
together with “chains built on complicity between legal and illegal practice.”154  Even 
if predominantly so, these instruments of power are not exclusive to the state. 
Apparent contradictions between different norms provide a variety of positions from 
which members of civil society can address power, strategically intervening in this 
                                                
151 Lisa Hajjar, supra note 7.  
152 Emphasizing the common interests of citizens and non-citizens who are effectively 
subjects of the same regime, Ariela Azoulay has suggested replacing the discussion of citizens 
with a discussion of “the governed.” See particularly in the first chapter of ARIELLA AZOULAY, 
THE CIVIL CONTRACT OF PHOTOGRAPHY (2008)  
153 Kahn, supra note 2, at 19.  
154 John and Jean Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction, in LAW AND 
DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1, 18 (John & Jean Comaroff eds., 2006).  
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legal-political nexus. So far, the success of such interventions in stopping torture has 
been limited. This, however, is not a necessary result.    
Whereas such channels of intervention are open, in principle, both to Israeli 
citizens and Palestinian non-citizens, for the latter they are much harder to access. 
Even though Palestinians are (almost) the only victims of torture, the bureaucracy is 
designed to repress the complaints they file and criminal procedure is designed to look 
away. Even with all the historical shifts we have discussed, the vulnerability of non-
citizens remains constant over time. Indeed, it is the political condition of torture 
since antiquity. In the ancient Greek polis, confessions were coerced only from the 
bodies of slaves and non-citizens; in recent centuries, torture has been practiced 
almost exclusively on the bodies of slaves, and, later colonized populations.155   
As Darius Rejali has explained, the emergence of human rights discourse and 
other norms of public accountability have not resulted in an abolishment of torture in 
democracies.156  Rather, democracies have continuously adopted and elaborated 
clandestine techniques of torture. Israel is not unique in this. What is unique, to our 
knowledge, is the emergence of legal structures endorsing practices of torture.   
Whereas initially the Landau Commission constituted a regime of impunity based 
on legalizing “moderate physical pressure,” Public Committee brought about a structural 
shift in impunity. This newfound impunity, which we have labeled un-prosecution, now 
seems to be expanding, particularly to the United States, but to other parts of “The 
West” as well. Un-prosecution does not necessarily employ all the legal mechanisms and 
rhetorical strategies of (Israeli) necessity management that we have discussed; necessity 
management may be thought of as a subcategory of un-prosecution. This is a regime that 
does not allow for a legalization of torture but nevertheless makes remedies 
unavailable. It originates not from democracy, as does stealthy torture, but from a 
unique mixture of democratic institutions and an enduring undemocratic control of 
(Palestinian) civil society.    
2. The Position of the Victims 
This political structure is immoral. Today, the position of the victims of torture 
who return to their societies after incarceration is comparable to the position of the 
victims of Nazi death camps after World War II ended. Initially, their experiences 
were unbelievable. The horrors they described were often too bad to be true. Thus, their 
recent life histories were impossible to articulate in the public sphere. The systematic 
annihilation of evidence is particularly significant in both cases; the “extermination” 
camps have come to signify the extermination not only of life, but also of the paper 
trail that would have immediately and undeniably proven the existence of the crime, 
its vastness, and the ongoing agony of its victims.157  A moral theory that would do 
justice to such victims would focus on the strange status of wrongs that in certain 
                                                
155 Hajjar, supra note 7, at 317. 
156 REJALI, supra note 43. 
157 Paraphrasing LYOTARD, supra note 16, at 56.  
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social or discursive conditions cannot be articulated in the public sphere. A “victim” is 
precisely someone who is not recognized as such.   
Indeed, unrecognized victims whose suffering is impossible to articulate publicly 
are the gloomy shadows that seem to accompany any discussion of modern 
democratic torture. Rejali opens the momentous Torture and Democracy with a 
description of someone who was saved from becoming such a victim by sheer luck. 
Explaining how Rodney King was brutally assaulted by Los Angeles police officers, 
receiving repeated electric shocks, he quotes the Independent Commission of the Los 
Angeles Police Department: “[w]hether there even would have been a Los Angeles 
Police Department investigation without the video is doubtful, since the efforts of 
King’s brother, Paul, to file a complaint were frustrated, and the report of the 
involved offices was falsified.”158 And in a poignant observation that fits perfectly into 
this context, he compares the violence that has saturated public discourse to the 
subdued voices of the tortured: “[s]ome argue that we are desensitized to violence we 
see on the evening news, but about violence we can’t see–even when its effect lies 
before our eyes, shaping the very flow of traffic in our streets–we cannot reflect, much 
less react.”159  
Considering such uncounted victims, Rejali makes an important distinction 
between “clean” and “scarring” torture techniques.160 Whereas scarring techniques 
leave conspicuous marks on the body, clean techniques are physically painful 
interrogation methods that leave few or no marks. In line with the movement we 
suggested from the tortured body to the legal environment in which it is couched, a 
complementary distinction between clean and scarring legal regimes of torture is 
useful. Clean methods of torture are the invention of democratic regimes, rather than 
totalitarian ones. The public monitoring and free flow of information has 
paradoxically shaped methods of torture so as not to mutilate the body, in effect 
making them much more difficult to recognize publicly and to talk about.   
Hence, we propose to distinguish between clean and scarring legal regimes of 
torture. Necessity management is a clean legal regime, as is un-prosecution at large. At best, 
they leave the victim of torture in the position of public silence. At worst, something 
like a “necessity procedure” becomes whitewashed legal language that goes hand in 
hand with the clean techniques applied to the body. 
Compared to the reality in the interrogation room, rules and regulations seem 
inherently clean, even if the lowly courts that apply them–from the military courts of 
the West Bank to the Military Commissions of Guantanamo–often seem to be 
drowning in mud.161  Indeed, invoking “scarring regulations” can only be a metaphor. 
                                                
158 REJALI, supra note 43, at 2. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Hajjar described the dilapidated physical conditions of Ofer, the Israeli Military Court 
adjacent to a prison at the outskirts of Ramallah, supra note 72. For pictures and discussion of 
the physical structure and presence of Guantanamo, see JUDITH RESNIK AND DENIS CURTIS, 
REPRESENTING JUSTICE: FROM CITY-STATES TO DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS AND 
GUANTANAMO BAY (2007).   
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But is it a misleading one? For the Landau Commission, itself a “scarring” legal 
instrument inasmuch as it sought to render torture legal and conspicuous, it was 
precisely the cleansing effect of the rule of law that provided authority. Rejali’s 
argument that the widespread public monitoring in democracies creates incentives to 
develop clean methods of torture also suggests that the Commission’s 
recommendations should be perceived as clean; that is, it was precisely the public 
response to foul practices that led to the establishment of the Commission to begin 
with. Is such a touch of law inherently clean?  
The answer is no. For the “cleaning” effect the Landau Commission sought 
reveals the undemocratic premises it was based upon–most strikingly not in the very aim 
to legalize torture, but in the way it divides the actors who create the legal regime 
from the defendants who are subject to it. The latter are not granted an opportunity 
to participate in the conversation.162  The Commission does not even mention trying 
to hear the victims. It was only with democratizing transnational public monitoring 
that the clean regulation of torture was brought about in Public Committee.163  
Whereas the quintessential moral problem with scarring methods (whether 
physical or legal) is the actual harm they do to helpless bodies, the moral problems 
with clean methods are presented most clearly by the silenced victims in their 
banishment from the public sphere. This would be important even in scarring legal 
regimes that manifestly legitimized torture did not allow for a legal remedy. At least 
then the victim could say: here is my body; here are my scars; and here is the 
ordinance (or the report) that allowed them to do this to me.     
3. The Laws of Torture and the History of the Lie 
Creating fear is a central method of covering up the evidence of torture, precisely 
because it is a condition for the use of torture.  In order to account for this emotion, 
one must consider the actualization of the “worst nightmare” of unbearable pain as a 
means of extracting information. On the other hand, one must also consider fear 
itself–regardless of whether it is actualized with pain–as perhaps more fundamental in 
the logic of torture. Which of these two is a more decisive aspect of what is happening 
in the interrogation room? It is difficult to decide.164  But whichever one has 
precedence, what is important to realize is that pain and fear remain mutually reliant.  
                                                
162 “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of 
all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.” See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, 66 (1990). 
163 Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: To Thine Own Self be True, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1984, at 
A. The New York Times first published the information that led to the public scandal in 1984, 
after it became clear that two terrorists captured on a Line 300 bus were killed while in 
custody. As indicated above, this scandal ignited the public turmoil that led to appointing the 
Landau Commission. The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 148. 
164 For a philosophical exegesis of this indecisiveness, and its centrality in a 
conceptualization of sovereignty, see AGAMBEN, supra note 24, at 39-48 (discussing 
“potentiality”). 
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Imagine an alternative world in which an inventory of legal interrogation 
techniques would be publicly accessible. This album would perhaps be posted by the 
government online and may go so far as to provide pictorial specifications of every 
possibility of physical contact in the interrogation room. This free access would be 
conceived as a fundamental right of suspects and detainees, but also of the 
interrogators; if indicted, suspected torturers would simply be able to show that they 
were following the manual. Everyone would be presumed to be knowledgeable about 
criminal regulations relating to interrogation (nullum crimen sine lege). The very 
implausibility of this imaginary world illuminates the centrality of fear in any 
explanation of torture.165   
Furthermore, this little thought experiment also goes to show the way lies are 
structurally embedded in the history of torture. Just like fear, lies too seem to be a 
necessary condition for torture. The winking understanding that harsh interrogation 
methods can always be used is itself a lie. If fear and secrecy are indeed the most 
salient and definitive aspects of torture, this little lie may also be a necessary condition  
for policing and politics in general. For, as is made clear in Public Committee, even 
though the police are not authorized to inflict pain, they are allowed to cause fear. 
Arendt, at least, seems to think that this link between state secrets and lies is an 
essential aspect of government at large:  
Secrecy–what diplomatically is called “discretion,” as well as arcana imperii, the mysteries 
of government–and deception, the deliberate falsehood and the outright lie used to 
legitimate means to achieve political ends, have been with us since the beginning of 
recorded history. Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and 
lies have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings. Whoever reflects 
on these matters can only be surprised by how little attention has been paid, in our 
tradition of philosophical and political thought, to their significance, on the one hand 
for the nature of action and, on the other, for the nature of our ability to deny in 
thought and word whatever happens to be the case.166 
But the lie Arendt writes about here, a lie which quite literally “goes without 
saying,” does not do justice to the short history of torture presented above. State 
authorities have confronted the most blatant of lies; they have problematized them, 
made them an object of public discussion, and, indeed, have initiated interventions in 
them. They have thus brought about not simply the ubiquitous lie upon which torture 
is conditioned–or the lie of politics, which Arendt is concerned with–but also a short 
history of the lie. 
Our history of legal engagement with torture begins with this confrontation in the 
Landau Report. Here, it takes the form of a hierarchy of values. For the Landau 
Commission, the prohibition of torture is important but should be trumped by 
security considerations; the prohibition on perjury, on the other hand, is absolute, and 
cannot be circumvented. This position is understandable, considering the fact that 
                                                
165 As we have shown above, this manual exists in one form or another, but is simply kept 
as a secret norm. 
166 HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC, 4-5 (1972). 
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violence in general is such a pervasive aspect of law enforcement. Lying, as Arendt 
notes, is not perceived to be central to sovereignty, as it is in fact regularly denied–
much more often than violence.167   
The Commission adapts a version of a Kantian position on lying. It conceptualizes 
the duty of truth as a necessary condition for legality–for the existence of “rights.” For 
Kant, “a lie is defined merely as an intentionally untruthful declaration to another 
man,” and “does not require the additional condition that it must do harm to 
another, as jurists require in their definition. For a lie always harms another . . . 
inasmuch as it vitiates the source of right.”168  The commission agrees with the 
interrogators that the lies were not harmful, but still perceives them as a threat to the 
justice system at large. Kant’s viewpoint remains purely and formally juridical (or 
meta-juridical). It corresponds to the concern with the formal condition of right and 
the social contract. Kant thus excludes in his definition of the lie all the historicity 
that, by contrast, Arendt introduces into its very essence.169  As we will see, the 
commission also chooses to think of these lies in a rather abstracted, disembodied 
way.  
Kant discusses the conditions of law, but distinguishes his position from that of 
“the jurists.” In the short quotation above, we are nevertheless hinted that there is a 
history of the lie, at least in the form of an alternative position to Kant’s. One jurist 
who holds that alternative position is Alan Dershowitz. In his critique of the Landau 
Report, he asks why torture can be performed under the necessity doctrine, but 
perjury cannot be justified. He finds no logic in the Commission’s position.170  In that 
respect, he seems to be in agreement with the interrogators interviewed by the 
Commission who asserted that they did not have any option other than lying. But he 
does not seem to understand the magnitude of the lie that will be exposed if the 
interrogators are left unprosecuted. As Avigdor Feldman, attorney for the Public 
Committee Against Torture, has explained, this would turn the whole justice system 
into a kind of lie. Well before the Landau Report was published, Feldman argued: 
[T]here are two possibilities as far as the courts are concerned. If the Landau 
Commission determines that the GSS agents lied in almost all of the cases in which 
they appeared in court, and that this practice had been going on for a long time, then 
either everything that we know and think we know about the courts being able to assess 
evidence, uncover the truth, and distinguish between truth and falsehood is total 
rubbish, and the courts do not know how to tell truth from lies, or there is a real case of 
cooperation [between judges and security agents]. In both cases . . . the implications 
are shocking and disturbing.171 
                                                
167 Id. 
168 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 64 (James 
Ellington trans., 1993); JACQUES DERRIDA, WITHOUT ALIBI 44 (Peggy Kamuf, ed., 2002). 
169 These are points Jacques Derrida makes in his essay History of the Lie: Prolegomena, in 
WITHOUT ALIBI, id.  
170 See Dershowitz, supra note 24.   
171 See Hajjar, supra note 72, at 110. 
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 Thus, we have two distinct positions in this short history of lies in the law of 
torture. One is the Landau Commission’s position, an austere and a-historical 
Kantianism, which nevertheless allows for torture. The Commission condemns the 
individuals’ perjury, while lying about systemic features of the justice system. But the 
other position merits consideration as well. It espouses a kind of "philanthropic" lie, 
for the good of the polity. This position appears in both the interrogators’ interviews 
and Dershowitz’s response to the Commission.  
We are now equipped to ask perhaps the most difficult question: what kind of lie, if 
any, is presented by Justice Barak’s decision in Public Committee?  Granted, the business 
of accusing someone of lying is a difficult one from the start. “One will never be able 
prove anything against the person who says, ‘What I said is not true; I was wrong, to 
be sure, but I did not mean to deceive; I am in good faith.’"172   
Precision also requires specifying that Barak’s holding is not a factual statement: he 
does not say “from now on there shall be no torture,” a proposition that would surely 
be a lie. The lie in the opinion is that it implies a kind of conviction not to torture, a 
moral decisiveness against it, when it actually allows torture to continue. Regardless of 
whether this tacit authorization is intentional or simply a result of negligence where 
continued torture is reasonably foreseeable, it presents a third model in our short 
history of the lie. It is the model of performing a promise while failing to create the 
circumstances for its fulfillment.173  This is central to the strategy of un-prosecution.    
4. Managing Torture in America 
As torture has become such a pervasive aspect of the United States’ “War on 
Terror,” the comparison between Israeli and American regulation of torture becomes 
valuable. Very broadly speaking, a movement from legitimation to un-prosecution can 
be identified in the U.S., perhaps as is a movement from scarring legal instruments to 
clean ones. While the Bush administration sought to legitimize torture, using an 
approach similar to that of the Landau Report,174  the Obama administration seems 
to have moved towards a strategy of un-prosecution. To be sure, we know of no 
undisputable evidence of torture during the Obama administration. However, leaning 
on the state secrets doctrine, the administration has consistently denied victims of 
torture access to the evidence of their abuse. In other words, it is positioning them in 
an institutionalized position of silence. As the Israeli experience has shown, this 
position is closely bound to the existence of additional torture, which is imminent. It 
will not be proven in courts or compensated for, and there will be no paper trail to 
point to. As the arguments that have been applied in the American context have been 
                                                
172 DERRIDA, supra note 169, at 34. 
173 Id., at 37. 
174 Scheppele gives a rather concise description of the “hopelessly technical hairsplitting” 
during the Bush administration that allowed for legalizing torture outside the U.S. See 
Scheppele, supra note 2, at 291. 
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discussed and reviewed extensively, we will only review them quickly and offer a 
provisional comparison.175  
The Bush administration invoked many arguments that were very different from 
those brought up in the Israeli context. Particularly, a complete phenomenology of 
pain absent from the Israeli discussion was developed.176  In Israel, the analysis was 
based on possible charges against security officials for various crimes from the general 
penal code, such as assault, threat, etc. The discussion took this form largely because 
the very existence of the GSS, let alone its modes of activity, was not authorized by 
statute. In the U.S., on the other hand, the discussion was shaped by the fact that the 
interrogations took place outside the territory of the country, an argument that was 
never available in Israel.  
Nevertheless, shortly after the first allegations of torture were voiced in February 
2002, President Bush invoked necessity, arguing that prisoners would be treated 
consistently with the Geneva Convention “to the extent appropriate and consistent 
with military necessity.”177  Doctrinally, “military necessity,” as used in International 
Humanitarian Law, is not the “necessity” discussed by the Landau Commission or in 
Public Committee, which is the regular criminal law defense. How easily these categories 
fade into each other is illustrated by the invocation of the criminal law justification 
just six months after Bush’s statement in John Yoo’s famous memo: “under the 
current circumstance, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that 
may violate the criminal prohibition on torture.”178  
Proportionality analysis, also an important instrument in necessity management, goes a 
long way to legitimize torture in the American context as well. In his analysis of pain, 
Yoo lays out pain of multiple shapes and colors, explaining how each nuance 
reaches–or rather does not reach–the level of “torture.” Discussing a possible 
argument of self-defense, he quotes LaFave and Scott, who, in a discussion that is not 
specifically about torture, write: “the amount of force which [the defender] may 
justifiably use must be reasonably related to the threatened harm which he seeks to 
avoid.”179  Two months after the memo was issued, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver 
wrote that “use of a wet towel to induce the misperception of suffocation,” or 
                                                
175 For a more detailed account, see Scheppele, supra note 2; see also Luan, supra note 5.  For 
the paper trail, see JAMEEL JAFFER & AMRIT SINGH, ADMINISTRATOIN OF TORTURE: A 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM WASHINGTON TO ABU GHREIB AND BEYOND (2007).  
176 Jay Bybee, Memorandum for A. Gonzales Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A (Dep’t of Justice August 1, 2002). By “phenomenology of 
pain,” we refer to propositions that assume hierarchies of different levels of suffering, not based 
on scientific data but rather, it seems, on a kind of introspection. For example, on page one of 
the memo it is assumed that death is the highest level of the hierarchy, even thought it is not at 
all clear that death is indeed necessarily painful: “for an act to constitute torture . . . it must 
inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in 
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment 
of bodily function, or even death.”  
177 Luban, supra note 5, at 1453.  
178 Bybee, supra note 176, at 2.  
179 Id., at 43.  
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“waterboarding,” one of the more notorious methods of torture, is warranted, 
provided there is a legitimate national security objective.180  Again, the gravity of the 
method of torture is weighed against the underlying security purpose. Notice, 
however, that the use of proportionality analysis here is closer to that of the Landau 
Report than to the way it is absorbed into prosecutorial discretion under Public 
Committee. Like the Commission, Yoo uses the balancing of interests that the 
commission framed as “the principle of lesser evil” to obliterate the requirement of 
imminence.181             
The emphasis on confirmations from above, by now familiar from necessity management 
and particularly from the necessity procedure, also came into play in the Yoo memo, if in 
a slightly different way. Here, it took the form of a checklist of pre-approved 
techniques that allowed interrogators immunity.182  As Scheppelle explains, “at first 
the Bush administration tried to neutralize the memo by having the President state 
that all U.S. interrogations were required to ‘follow the law.’” But what is Law? Does 
following the law mean following internal guidelines? If law is to be interpreted as it 
was in the Yoo memo, it does not seem to prohibit much.183   
The Israeli practice of bringing a higher official into the torture room, physically 
or not, to authorize exceptions, probably came into play when particularly harsh 
methods were to be employed. A memorandum from Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld in April 2003 also conditioned such techniques on individualized 
approval.184  However, the defense of following instructions from above has been a 
dubious one at least since Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem in 1961.185  
5. Torturous Legal Traditions  
Alan Dershowitz has been one of the most outspoken and cited supporters of 
efforts to contain torture within the rule of law. Dershowitz developed his idea of 
                                                
180 Diane Beaver, Memorandum for Commander, United States Southern Command, 
3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, Florida 33172-1217 Subject: Counter-Resistance Strategies 
(Dep’t of Defense, 11 October 2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).   
181 Bybee, supra note 176, at 33. See also Scheppelle, supra note 2, at 322 (“The principle of 
lesser evil has loomed large not only in legal discussions, but in the popular mind right away 
after the September 11th attack. In October 2001, on CNN’s Crossfire, the right-winger Tucker 
Carlson suggested that, under certain circumstances, torture may be ‘the lesser of two evils.’”); 
MacMaster, supra note 19, at 4.  
182 Scheppelle, supra note 2, at 297. 
183 Id. at 296. 
184 Id. at 308. See Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum for the Commander, US Southern 
Command, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (The Secretary 
of Defense, 16 April, 2003). Rumsfeld writes, "If, on your view, you require additional 
interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique, recommended 
safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee."  
185 See ARENDT, supra note 102 
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instituting “torture warrants” in the late nineteen eighties. At the time, his suggestions 
were drawn directly from the Landau Report.186  Yoo’s memorandum also shows 
signs of the same inspiration.  
Yoo’s comparative law analysis is limited to just two case citations. One is Barak’s 
decision in Public Committee, which he uses to substantiate the proposition that the 
methods Barak discussed do not constitute torture. Yoo emphasizes that Barak does 
not name them “torture;” therefore, he concludes, they must have been perceived as 
not included in that definition.187   Yoo discusses the Ireland v. United Kingdom case in 
the European Court of Human Rights.188  This case is also the first precedent relied 
upon in the Landau Report, and the Commission’s analysis is very similar to Yoo’s. 
We do not know if Yoo actually read the Landau Report before writing his memo; 
but at the least, they belong to the same torturous legal tradition that by now has its 
own transnational legal conversations and common historical sources. 
President Obama’s policy on torture is still taking shape. Ostensibly, Obama has 
repudiated torture. However, his decision not to prosecute Bush Administration 
officials implicated in torture, coupled with his invocation of the state secrets privilege, 
functions to silence torture victims.  
The decision not to indict Bush Administration officials was publicly explained as 
an attempt to avoid alienating a large part of the American population who supported 
the previous administration. Framed this way, prosecution becomes a form of political 
persecution. 
However, even a policy barring criminal indictments would not obviate the need 
to compensate the victims. Such compensation would not even require exposing the 
evidence of torture, as with the compensation offered by the Canadian government to 
Maher Arrar, a Syrian who was tortured under the renditions program. Only if the 
Administration had offered the victims some form of public recognition could it really 
claim that un-prosecution stemmed from the political considerations it claimed. For the 
time being, the failure to do so cannot be merely an issue of “litigating the past,” as 
Obama said. For the victims of torture, as long as the present conditions of non-
recognition remain, the past limits the horizons of the future. 
A much more plausible reason to avoid prosecution is the recognition that there is 
no guarantee that it will stop at low level perpetrators in the interrogation room; the 
investigation would have to reach all the way up to Rumsfeld and probably to Bush. 
Such trials bring to mind revolutionary show trials against the ancien régime. But to 
accept that such trials are impossible is to accept a maxim at least as old as the Israeli 
occupation in the West Bank and Gaza and its necessity management: get yourself a high-
ranking accomplice, and you’re fine. This form of impunity, grounded as it is on 
confirmation and consultation procedures that both Rubinstein and Rumsfeld have 
built on, is extremely resilient. Paul Kahn articulated this resilience when he brushed 
away the possibility that Public Committee will yield indictments for torture. He points 
                                                
186 Dershowitz, supra note 24. See also MacMaster, supra note 19, at 11.  
187 Bybee, supra note 176, at 30.  
188 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 2 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 25  (1978). 
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out that, “short of defeat and victor’s justice, it is hard to imagine such a prosecution 
being brought in a case in which there is a reasonable claim in support of the 
[necessity] defense. Conversely, if the conditions exist for that prosecution, it is hard 
to imagine the defense being successful.”189  What seems to be at stake is the integrity 
of the polity; but choosing political integrity is also a choice to silence the victim of 
what has, for the same polity, traditionally been considered one of the most heinous 
crimes. 
In what we would argue constitutes torture, a U.S. court and government attorney 
pushed Binyam Mohamed to confess to terrorism crimes as part of a plea bargain; he 
would gain freedom if he denied that he was ever tortured and promised not to talk about 
his torture after his release.190  This agreement, initiated in October 2009, is a 
paradigmatic example of un-prosecution in the Obama era. On the one hand, we are in 
the “classic” realm of torture, aimed at extracting a confession. As we saw in the 
context of the Landau Commission, the now-accepted story that the application of 
torture is limited solely to information collection is refuted. On the other hand, 
silencing the victim is no longer an auxiliary result of torture; it is a new and 
independent act of torture in and of itself.191   
Recently, the British government has decided to settle with former Guantanamo 
detainees, including Mohamed, paying them millions of pounds in order not to go to 
trial.192  As Peter Goldsmith, British Attorney General under Tony Blair, explained, 
this was not an admission of guilt. The settlement is an important demonstration of 
the British commitment to the rule of law. Even if this solution will allow the 
government to refrain from exposing some of the information on what happened in 
Guantanamo, it presents itself–unlike the position of the Obama administration–as 
commitment to truth: “I think the most important part of this settlement is that it now 
clears the way for a public inquiry into these allegations of torture and complicity in 
torture which has already been announced,” said Goldsmith.193     
 
                                                
189 Kahn, supra note 2, at 13. 
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191 See in this context John Langbein’s thesis on the historical connection between plea-
bargaining and torture, supra note 142. Binyam Mohamad did not agree to this plea bargain, 
and did not plead guilty. In February 2009 he was returned to Britain, with no charges filed 
against him.   
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In its conclusion, the Landau Commission Report situates the reader at an historic 
crossroads. Either we continue to live with illicit state practices, or we accept a limited 
amount of torture under the auspices of law. The rhetoric is dramatic, and the stakes 
seem to be high. The first option is presented as “the choice of the hypocrite.”  
The Commission cautions against a political choice of hypocrisy. It uses imagery 
from an interview with a GSS interrogator to illustrate the nature of such a choice. It 
invites the reader to imagine the ordinary Israeli sitting in a sunny backyard. That 
person doesn’t want to know or see what is going on in the sewage system running 
under him and into his house. But this infrastructure is what allows him to sunbathe 
in a livable environment.194   
Such an image, explains the Commission, implicitly allows security to take place in 
the twilight of illegality. The political costs are high; it is exactly the kind of 
environment that potentially allows security to gain independence from the state, and 
act according to its own standards and with no outside accountability. Security can 
then become “a state within a state,” as the Commission puts it.195  But is the only 
other option to recognize torture as legal? A survey of Israeli and American history 
indeed reinforces that impression. In this article we have shown that torture has been 
more or less constant across Israeli history, and the only thing that has changed is its 
legal management. The United States is going in the same direction.    
But of course, we do not feel obliged to choose between these two options. The 
very presentation of these as two distinct options is highly dubious. Quite to the 
contrary, empirical evidence suggests that movement towards legitimizing torture 
perpetuates a growing zone of independence and impunity in security services, above 
and beyond what is allowed by law.196   Harsh torture techniques that have been 
recognized but limited in various ways have tended to “migrate” across theatres of 
war and spread virally.197  Every step toward legitimation opens up new frontiers for 
“hypocrisy” and for exceeding the already permissive limitations enumerated by the 
law. This dynamic is tightly bound with the fact that contemporary torture is always 
psychological. No less than obtaining information through the use of physical pain, it 
extracts information by relying on the victim’s imagination of the unknown method 
that may come next, lurking behind the corner of its own legal limitations.    
Today, after torture has ostensibly (again) been abolished in the United States, we 
have returned to the “twilight zone” the Landau Commission warned about. A 
regime that manages torture by condemning it, while at the same time protecting its 
perpetrators, is not morally superior to a regime that openly tortures. Palestinians and 
Israelis under Israeli control have lived under one of these two options at least since 
1967, when, according to the Landau Commission, “physical pressure” in 
                                                
194 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 162.  
195 Id. at 163. 
196 REJALI, supra note 43, at 446–479, 519–536. 
197 Scheppelle, supra note 2, at 317.  
Vol. 6:59, 2010 MANN & SHATZ: THE NECESSITY PROCEDURE 109 
 
 
interrogations first became systematic.198  It is no mere circumstance that this 
happened precisely when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza; torture was 
deemed a necessary part of protecting Israel from Palestinians, who remained stateless 
and were now subject to military rule. In order to understand the similar relationship 
that developed between law and torture in the U.S. after 9/11, one must realize that 
in inspiration at least, it was imported from the non-democratic Israeli context.  
The rhetorical move the Landau Commission makes in its presentation of the two 
options clear: by not discussing an option of living without torture, the Commission 
powerfully asserts that such an option is impossible. But according to the accepted 
public narrative, this impossible option is the one that societies in Israel and the U.S. 
have actually chosen, at least as the ideal to strive for. The Commission’s narrative 
may be true only inasmuch as the political option of inclusive democracy is not even 
pondered.  
To be sure, if there were the political will to take such a course of action, the steps 
to be taken are clear. Bearing in mind the contemporary tendency towards clean 
methods of torture and clean regulation of torture, the objective should be to allow 
some filth into the public sphere. In other words, fighting torture depends on the 
opportunity to know about and talk about torture.  It requires procedural mechanisms 
that ensure, as Elaine Scary has put it, the transparency of government and the 
opaqueness of the citizen.199   
Thus, fighting the contemporary patterns of torture entails focusing on the 
prohibition’s enforcement mechanisms. Evidentiary considerations are an important 
aspect of this fight. In civil suits, the burden of proof to show that someone was not 
tortured could be shifted to the government, as the doctrine already requires in 
criminal cases. But as we have shown in the Israeli example, other regulations can 
turn this doctrine into a dead letter. Similar evidentiary reforms have been proposed 
by feminist legal scholars, who have described the political construction of the ways 
we acquire knowledge and evidence, and therefore also the means to articulate 
wrongs.200  Many of the same lessons apply when it comes to giving the tortured a 
voice. It is thus necessary to take up and give a normative response to not only the 
reality of torture, but also to the meta-reality of the destruction of the evidence of 
torture.201  
                                                
198 The Landau Report, supra note 14, at 158. 
199 ELAINE SCARRY, RULE OF LAW, MISRULE OF MEN (MIT Press 2010).   
200 See, e.g., Francis Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387 
(1984-1985); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EVIDENCE (Mary Childs and Louise Ellison eds., 
2000). 
201 Paraphrasing LYOTARD, supra note 16, at 57:  
[W]ith Auschwitz, something new has happened in history (which can only be a sign 
and not a fact), which is that facts, the testimonies which bore the traces of here’s and 
now’s, the documents which indicated the sense or senses of the facts, and the names, 
finally the possibility of various kind of phrases whose conjunction makes reality, all this 
has been destroyed as much as possible. Is it up to the historian to take into account not 
only the damages, but also the wrong? Not only the reality, but also the meta-reality 
that is the destruction of reality? Not only the testimony, but also what is left of the 
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When torture is part of a regime that differentiates between two populations, only 
one of which is granted access to public participation, the legal system may adopt 
even more dramatic measures. Justice Mahomed of the South African Constitutional 
Court articulates the role of such legal measures after explaining the unspeakable 
position of torture victims. Like un-prosecution, these far-reaching legal measures can 
sometimes require compromising justice by way of decisions not to prosecute.  
Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in 
our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, 
unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded 
memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatizing to the 
survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and 
corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Act seeks to address this massive problem by encouraging these 
survivors and the dependents of the tortured and the wounded, the maimed and the 
dead to unburden their grief publicly . . . That truth, which the victims of repression 
seek so desperately to know, is, in the circumstances, much more likely to be 
forthcoming if those responsible for such monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to 
disclose the whole truth with the incentive that they will not receive the punishment 
which they undoubtedly deserve if they do.202  
But then again, perhaps the very fact that quite mundane normative solutions are 
readily available indicates that they miss a more fundamental problem: that we live in 
a world where governmental actors have never seriously considered truly doing away 
with torture. The political imagination of such a world is constrained by a truly 
naturalistic, apolitical understanding of necessity: in order to make an omelet, it is 
necessary to break a few eggs.  
 
 
                                                                                                                           
testimony when it is destroyed (the dilemma), namely, the feeling? Not only the 
litigation, but also the differend?  
202 Azapo & Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996(4) SA 671 (CC) at 
paragraph 17 (S. Afr.). 
